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श्रीलक्ष्मीधरकवि विरचित

अद्वैतमकरन्दः

श्री स्वयम्प्रकाशयतिप्रणीतया
'रसाभिव्यञ्जिका' व्याख्यया



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श्रीलक्ष्मीधरकवि विरचित

अद्वैतमकरन्दः

श्लो।।कटाक्ष किरणाचान्तनमन्मोहाब्धये नमः।

अनन्तानन्दकृष्णाय जगन्मङ्गलमूर्तये।।1।।

श्लो।।अहमस्मि सदा भामि कदाचिन्नाहमप्रियः।

ब्रह्मैवाहमतः सिद्धं सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणम्।।2।।

श्लो।।मय्येवोदेति चिद्व्योम्नि जगद्गन्धर्वपत्तनम्।

अतोऽहं न कथं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वकारणम्।।3।।

श्लो।।न स्वतः प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्निरंशत्वान्न चान्यतः।

न चाश्रयविनाशान्मे विनाशः स्यादनाश्रयात्।।4।

श्लो।।न शोषप्लोषविक्लेदच्छेदाश्चिन्नभसो मम।

सत्यैरप्यनिलाग्न्यम्भः शस्त्रैः किमुत कल्पितैः।।5।।

श्लो।।अभारूपस्य विश्वस्य भानं भासंनिधेर्विना।

कदाचिन्नावकल्पेत भा चाहं तेन सर्वगः।।6।।

श्लो।।नहि भानादृते सत्त्वं नर्ते भानं चितोऽचितः।
चित्संभेदोऽपि नाध्यासादृते तेनाहमद्वयः।।7।।

श्लो।।न देहो नेन्द्रियं चाहं न प्राणो न मनो न धीः।
ममतापरिरब्धत्वादाक्रीडत्वादिदं धियः।।8।।

श्लो।।साक्षी सर्वान्वितः प्रेयानहं नाहं कदाचन।
परिणामपरिच्छेदपरितापैरुपप्लवात्।।9।।

श्लो।।सुप्तेहमि न दृश्यन्ते दुःखदोषप्रवृत्तयः।
अतस्तस्यैव संसारो न मे संसर्तुसाक्षिणः।।10।।

श्लो।।सुप्तः सुप्तिं न जानाति नाऽसुप्ते स्वप्नजागरौ।
जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तीनां साक्ष्यतोऽहमतद्दृशः।।11।।

श्लो।।विज्ञानविरतिः सुप्तिस्तज्जन्म स्वप्नजागरौ।
तत्साक्षिणः कथं मे स्युर्नित्यज्ञानस्य ते त्रयः।।12।।

श्लो।।षड्विकारवतां वेत्ता निर्विकारोऽहमन्यथा।
तद्विकारानुसंधानं सर्वथा नावकल्पते।।13।।

श्लो।।तेन तेन हि रूपेण जायते लीयते मुहुः।

विकारि वस्तु तस्यैषामनुसंधातृता कुतः।।14।।

श्लो।।न च स्वजन्म नाशं वा द्रष्टुमर्हति कश्चन।

तौ हि प्रागुत्तराभावचरमप्रथमक्षणौ।।15।।

श्लो।।न प्रकाशेऽहमित्युक्तिर्यत्प्रकाशैकनिबन्धनः।

स्वप्रकाशं तमात्मानमप्रकाशः कथं स्पृशेत्।।16।।

श्लो।।तथाप्याभाति कोऽप्येष विचाराभावजीवनः।

अवश्यायश्चिदाकाशे विचारार्कोदयावधिः।।17।।

श्लो।।आत्माज्ञानमहानिद्राजृम्भितेऽस्मिञ्जगन्मये।

दीर्घस्वप्ने स्फरन्त्येते स्वर्गमोक्षादिविभ्रमाः।।18।।

श्लो।।जडाजडविभागोऽयमजडे मयि कल्पितः।

भित्तिभागे समे चित्रचराचरविभागवत्।।19।।

श्लो।।चेत्योपरागरूपा मे साक्षितापि न तात्त्विकी।

उपलक्षणमेवेयं निस्तरङ्गचिदम्बुधेः।।20।।

श्लो।।अमृताब्धेर्न मे जीर्णिर्मृषाडिण्डीरजन्मभिः।

स्फटिकाब्धेर्न मे रागः स्वाप्नसंध्याभ्रविभ्रमैः।।21।।

श्लो।।स्वरूपमेव मे सत्त्वं न तु धर्मो नभस्त्ववत्।
मदन्यस्य सतोऽभावान्नहि सा जातिरिष्यते।।22।।

श्लो।।स्वरूपमेव मे ज्ञानं न गुणः स गुणो यदि।
अनात्मत्वमसत्वं वा ज्ञेयाज्ञेयत्वयोः पतेत्।।23।।

श्लो।।अहमेव सुखं नान्यदन्यच्चेन्नैव तत्सुखम्।
अमदर्थं न हि प्रेयो मदर्थं न स्वतः प्रियम्।।24।।

श्लो।।न हि नानास्वरूपं स्यादेकं वस्तु कदाचन।
तस्मादखण्ड ऐवास्मि विजहज्जागतीं भिदाम्।।25।

श्लो।।परोक्षतापरिच्छेदशाबल्यापोहनिर्मलम्।
तदसीति गिरा लक्ष्यमहमेकरसं महः।।26।।

श्लो।।उपशान्तजगज्जीवशिष्याचार्येश्वरभ्रमम्।
स्वतः सिद्धमनाद्यन्तं परिपूर्णमहं महः।।27।।

श्लो।।लक्ष्मीधरकवेः सूक्तिशरदम्भोजसंभृतः।
अद्वैतमकरन्दोऽयं विद्वद्भृङ्गैर्निपीयताम्।।28।।

।।इति श्रीलक्ष्मीधरकवि विरचित अद्वैमकरन्दः।।

विषयानुक्रमणिका



श्रीलक्ष्मीधरकविविरचितः

अद्वैतमकरन्दः

स्वयंप्रकाशकृतटीकासहितः



नित्यं निरन्तरानन्दं चिद्घनं ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ।[१]
श्रुत्या तर्कानुभूतिभ्यामहमस्म्यद्वयं सदा ॥१॥

अम्बागृहीतवामार्धं वन्दे चन्द्रकलाधरम् ।
लावण्यमधुराकारं कारुण्यरसवारिधिम् ॥२॥

कैवल्यानन्दयोगीन्द्रपादकञ्जरजोरविः ।
राजते मे हृदाकाशे मोहध्वान्तनिवर्तकः ॥३॥

शुद्धानन्दपदाम्भोजद्वन्द्वं सेवे यदुद्भवम् ।
निर्वाणरसमास्वाद्य[२] हृष्टाः शिष्यालिपङ्क्तयः ॥४॥

सच्चिदानन्दयोगीन्द्रा जयन्ति भुवि केचन ।
यत्कृपालवत[३]स्तीर्णो मया संसारवारिधिः ॥५॥

इह खलु लक्ष्मीधरो नाम कश्चित् कवीन्द्रो[४] निरन्तरनित्याद्यनुष्ठानशुद्धस्वान्ततया सञ्जातविवेकवैराग्यशमादिमुमुक्षावत आत्मविविदिषया संत्यक्तलोकवेदधर्मान् गुरुवर चरणोपसर्पणपुरःसरं सम्य[५]क्श्रुतवेदान्ततत्त्वेऽप्यसंभावनया प्रतिबन्ध[६]ज्ञानतयाऽपरितुष्यतः कांश्चित् पुरुषधौरेयानुपलभ्य सञ्जातकरुणस्तेषां करतलबिल्वफलवत्[७] स्फुटं वेदान्त प्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्म सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणं सर्वज्ञं सर्वोपादानं नित्यं सर्वगमद्वयं देहेन्द्रियप्राणमनो बुद्ध्यहङ्कारसाक्षि प्रत्यगभिन्नतया तर्कैः सम्भावयितुं किञ्चित् प्रकरणमद्वैतमकरन्दा ख्यमारभमाणश्चिकीर्षितस्याविघ्नेन[८] परिसमाप्तये स्वेष्टदेवताप्रणामरूपं मङ्गलं स्वयमनुष्ठाय शिष्यशिक्षायै ग्रन्थतो निबध्नाति—

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१. पं. ८, ८५ (जून २, १८७३) ९-२१.

२. –मासाद्य इति पा. ३. –बलत-इति पा. ४. पण्डितेन्द्र इत्यर्थः, ५. विधितः इति पा.

६. –नादिप्रतिबद्धज्ञा—इति पा. ७. –बिल्ववत् इति पा. ८. –तस्य तस्या-इति पा.

कटाक्षकिरणाचान्तनमन्मोहाब्धये नमः ।

अनन्तानन्दकृष्णाय जगन्मङ्गलमूर्तये ॥१ ॥

कटाक्षो भक्तेषु तिर्यक्पातिता[१] कृपादृष्टिः, तस्याः किरणेन प्रभया, आचान्तः शोषितो नमतां नमस्कर्तॄणां मोहोऽज्ञानं स एवाब्धिः समुद्रो येन सः, तथा तस्मै, श्रीगुरुपरमेश्वरप्रसादरहितानां दुस्तरत्वाद् भ्रान्तिपरम्परातरङ्गयुक्तत्वाद्रागादिमहाग्राहादियोगाच्च युक्तमज्ञानस्य समुद्रत्वम् । अनन्तानन्दकृष्णाय अनन्तो देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्य आनन्दः स्वरूपं यस्य सः, अनन्तानन्दः, स चासौ कृष्णश्च, अनन्तानन्दकृष्णः, वसुदेवकुमारः, तस्मै, जगन्मङ्गलमूर्तये जगतां लोकानां मङ्गलभूता सुखाभिवृद्धिकरी मूर्तिर्विग्रहो यस्य स जगन्मङ्गलमूर्तिस्तस्मै,[२] नमोऽस्तु[३] । जगन्मङ्गलमूर्तय इत्यनेन स्मृतिमात्रेण तस्यैहिकामुष्मिकपुरुषार्थपरिपन्थिविघ्ननिरासससामर्थ्यमुक्तम्, मङ्गलस्य तादृशत्वात् ॥१ ॥

एवमनुष्ठितस्वेष्टदेवतानमस्कारलक्षणमङ्गलनिबर्हितसकलान्तरायः प्रथमं[४] तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैस्तात्पर्ययुक्तैर्बोधितं प्रत्यगात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वं युक्त्या सम्भावयन्नाह—

अहमस्मि सदा भामि कदाचिन्नाहमप्रियः ।

ब्रह्मैवाऽहमतः सिद्धं सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणम् ॥२ ॥

अहमस्मीति । अहमहङ्कारादिसाक्ष्यस्मि, सद्रूपो भवामि, आत्मन्यध्यस्ताहङ्कारादेः सत्ताप्रदत्वात्, सदावस्थात्रयेऽपि भामि, जाग्रति देहेन्द्रियादिसाक्षितया, स्वप्नेऽन्तःकरण--वासनाप्रपञ्चसाक्षितया, सुषुप्तावज्ञानसाक्षितया च प्रकाशे, कदाचित्, कदाचिदपि, दुःखाद्यनुभवकालेऽपि, अहं नाप्रियो भवामि, नानिष्टो भवामि; किन्तु सदा प्रिय एव भवामि, दुःखादौ द्वेषस्यात्मस्नेहनिमित्तत्वाच्छत्रुदुःखादौ द्वेषस्यादर्शनात्, तथा च परमप्रीतिविषयत्वादानन्दरूपः; यस्मात् कालत्रयेऽप्यबाध्यमानत्वात् सद्रूपः, प्रकाश[५]मानत्वाच्चिद्रूपः,

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१. –द्विपातिता इति पा. २. स तथा तस्मै इति पा.

३.– स्तु । यद्वा कटाक्षः प्रतिभाक्षममन्तःकरणं तस्य किरणो वाक्यजन्यतद्वृत्तिप्रतिफलितं चैतन्यम्, तेनाचान्तो भक्षितो नमतां स्वात्मप्रवणानामन्तर्मुखाणां श्रवणादिपराणां मोहोऽज्ञानमेवाब्धिरसंख्याध्यासपरंपराकल्लोलोदयहेतुत्वादनेकानर्थदुष्टाह्यादियोगाच्च येन तस्मै, यद्वा कटाक्षोऽन्तिमप्रमाणं वाक्यजन्यवृत्तिरेव तदनन्तरं सर्वबाधेन प्रमाणादिव्यवहारप्रवृत्तेः, यत्र त्वस्येत्यादिश्रुतेः, अन्यत् पूर्ववत् । यद्वा कटाक्षवत् प्रसृतमपरोक्षं स्वरूपचैतन्यमेव "दिवीव चक्षुण्यतं", "यत् साक्षादपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्म" इत्यादिश्रुतेः, तस्य किरणेन शेषं पूर्ववत् । "अत्र पक्षे" कृषिर्भूवाचकः शब्दो नयतिर्वृत्तिवाचक इति कृष्णशब्दार्थो द्रष्टव्यः, जगतां मङ्गलकरी मूर्तिर्यस्य, "एतस्यैवानन्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति", "एष ह्येवानन्दयति" इत्यादिश्रुतेः । इति पा.

४. मङ्गलं सकलान्तरायशमनं विधाय प्रथमं इति पा.

५. अवस्थात्रये भास- इति पा.

परमप्रीतिविषयत्वादानन्दरूपश्च, तस्मादहं सच्चिदानन्दलक्षणं सच्चिदानन्दरूपं ब्रह्मेति सिद्धम्[१]। अत्रेदमनुमानं विवक्षितम्। प्रत्यगात्मा ब्रह्मणो न भिद्यते, सच्चिदानन्दरूपत्वात्, ब्रह्मवदिति, न च हेतुरसिद्धः, अहमस्मीत्यादिना तस्य साधितत्वात्।

नन्वनुमानस्य नाऽहमीश्वर इति प्रत्यक्षविरोध इति चेत्, न, तावदात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वे बाह्य-प्रत्यक्षविरोधः, आत्मनि रूपाद्यभावेन बाह्यस्य तत्राऽप्रवृत्तेः, नाऽपि मानसप्रत्यक्षविरोधः, मनसो मनःसाक्षिण्यात्मनि प्रवृत्तेरसम्भवात्।

ननु जीवेश्वरौ भिन्नौ, किञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिविरुद्धधर्माधारत्वाद्, दहनतुहिनवत्, इत्याद्यनुमानविरोध इति चेत्, न, विरुद्धधर्मवतोर्बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बयोरुच्चमन्दशब्दाधार आकाशे च व्यभिचारात्।

ननु "द्वा सुपर्णा" इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोध इति चेत्, न, तस्या अतत्परत्वेन तत्त्वमस्यादि श्रुत्या बाध्यमानत्वात्[२]।

तस्मान्नाहमीश्वर इति बुद्धिर्देहाद्युपाधिनिमित्ता भ्रान्तिः। न तु [३]जीवस्वरूपविषया। तदुक्तम्—

"त्वयि मयि च गण्यमाने मशकान्मशकोऽहमेव देहदृशा।

विश्वाधिकेश ते मे सद्बोधानन्दपूर्णता तुल्या" ॥इति।

अतोऽहं ब्रह्मैवेति भावः ॥२॥

ननु "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववि"दित्यादिश्रुत्या हि ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञतयावगम्यते, यतो वेत्यादि श्रुत्या च सर्वजगत्कारणतया च, प्रत्यगात्मा तु स्वशरीरादिकमपि साकल्येन न जानाति, स्वातन्त्र्येण किंचित् कर्तुमपि न शक्नोति, तत् कथमस्य सर्वज्ञेन सर्वकारणेन च ब्रह्मणाभेद इत्याशङ्क्य प्रत्यगात्मनोऽपि तद्द्वयमुपपादयति—

मय्येवोदेति चिद्व्योम्नि जगद्गन्धर्वपत्तनम्।

अतोऽहं न कथं ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वकारणम् ॥३॥

मय्येवेति। चिद्व्योम्नि चिदाकाशे मयि प्रत्यगात्मन्येव, जगद्गन्धर्वपत्तनं जगदेव गन्धर्वपत्तनम्, ऐन्द्रजालिकविक्षुब्धमायया मरणावस्थायां च मेघेषु प्रतीयमानं नगरं गन्धर्व पत्तनं नाम, तादृशमिदं जगदुदेति, उत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः। अयं भावः — मिथ्यापदार्थस्य हि द्रष्टैवोपादानम्, यथा स्वप्नप्रपञ्चस्य तत्साक्षी, तथा जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चस्यापि सर्वस्य दृश्यत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात् तद्द्रष्टा प्रत्यगात्मैवोपादानं वक्तव्यम्। तदुक्तम्—

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१. ब्रह्मैव भवामि इति पा. २. बाधात् इति पा. ३. शुद्धजीव-इति पा.

"यथा स्वप्नप्रपञ्चोऽयं मयि मायाविजृम्भितः ।

एवं जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चश्च मयि मायाविजृम्भितः" ॥इति ।

एवं च प्रत्यगात्मनस्तद्द्रष्टृत्वलक्षणं सर्वज्ञत्वं तदधिष्ठानत्वलक्षणं सर्वकारणत्वं च सिध्यति ।

ननु बहुदूरव्यवहितमेर्वादीनामदृश्यमानानां कथं प्रत्यगात्मा द्रष्टा, कथं वा तदुपादानमिति चेत्, शृणु तर्हि रहस्यम्, एतावन्तं कालं मेर्वादिकमहं नाज्ञासिषमिति ह्यज्ञानविशेषणतया मेर्वादिकं स्मर्यते, तच्च स्मरणं मेर्वाद्यनुभवं विनानुपपद्यमानं सन्मेर्वाद्यनुभवं कल्पयति, तत्र चेन्द्रियादीनामप्रवृत्तेः प्रत्यगात्मचैतन्येऽध्यस्ततयैव मेर्वाद्यनुभवो वक्तव्यः । अध्यस्तस्य चाधिष्ठानमेवोपादानं तद्भानादेव भानं च भवति, तथा च प्रत्यगात्मा स्वाध्यस्तमेर्वादेरप्यज्ञाततया साक्षी, तदुपादानं च भवति, तदुक्तं ब्रह्मगीतायाम्—

"ज्ञातरूपेण चाज्ञातस्वरूपेण च साक्षिणः ।

सर्वं भाति तदाभाति ततस्तद् व्यापि सर्वदा" ॥इति ।

तथा च प्रत्यगात्मा सर्वज्ञः सर्वकारणं चेति । यत उक्तप्रकारेण सर्वकारणं चाहमतः कथं तद्रूपं ब्रह्म न भवामि, भवाम्येवेत्यर्थः ॥३ ॥

ननु 'नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मम्' इत्याद्युपनिषत्सु नित्यं ब्रह्म श्रूयते, आत्मा च मरणादिधर्मकत्वादनित्य एवानुभूयते, ततश्च न तयोरैक्यमित्याशङ्क्य किमात्मनो बौद्धपक्ष इव स्वत एव नाशं ब्रवीषि, उत दण्डसंयोगाद्घटस्येवान्यसम्बन्धादात्मनो नाशं ब्रवीषि, अथवा पटनाशात् पटगतरूपादिवदाश्रयनाशान्नाशं ब्रवीषि, इति विकल्प्याद्यं प्रत्याह—

न स्वतः प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्निरंशत्वान्न चान्यतः ।

न चाश्रयविनाशान्मे विनाशः स्यादनाश्रयात् ॥४ ॥

न स्वत इति । मे प्रत्यगात्मनो मम न स्वतो नाशो भवति, तत्र हेतुः, प्रत्यभिज्ञानादात्मनः प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानं नाम पूर्वमनुभूतस्य कालान्तरे प्रमाणेन तत्तोल्लेखपूर्वकं ज्ञानम् । आत्मा हि योऽहं बाल्ये पितरावन्वभूवं स एवेदानीं स्थविरे प्रणप्तॄननुभवामि, योऽहं सुप्तः स्वप्नमद्राक्षं स एवेदानीं जागर्मीति च बाल्याद्यवस्थासु जाग्रदाद्यवस्थासु च प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । तच्च प्रत्यभिज्ञानमात्मनो निर्निमित्तनाशे नोपपद्यते । तथा हि, आत्मनो हि स्वतो नाशे प्रतिक्षणमन्योऽन्य आत्मेति वक्तव्यम् । तत्र कथं वान्योऽन्येन सोऽहमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायेत, आत्मा च सोऽहमित्यात्मानं प्रत्यभिजानाति । तस्मान्न तस्य स्वतो नाश इत्यर्थः ।

न द्वितीय इत्याह । निरंशत्वान्न चान्यत इति । निरंशत्वादंशरहितत्वान्निरवयवत्वाद् अन्यतो हेतुसंयोगादप्यात्मनो न नाश इत्यर्थः । आत्मा हि चिद्रूपत्वान्निरवयवः । यदि निरवयवस्यात्मनः[१] सावयवत्वमुच्येत, तर्हि वक्तव्यम्, आत्मावयवाश्चेतना अचेतना वा ।

नाद्यः, आत्मावयवानां हि प्रत्येकं चेतनत्वे विरुद्धाभिप्रायतया शरीरमुन्मथ्येत ।

न द्वितीयः, अचेतनैरवयवैरारब्धस्याप्यात्मनोऽप्यचेतनत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्, न ह्यचेतनैस्तन्तुभिरारब्धः पटश्चेतनो दृश्यते, ततो निरवयव एवात्मा, न निरवयवे चात्मनि हेतुसंयोगः सम्भवति, सत्यैकदेशवृत्तित्वात्, अतोऽन्यतोऽप्यात्मनो न नाश इति भावः ।

नापि तृतीय इत्याह । न चाश्रयेत्यादिना । आश्रयविनाशादाधारविनाशादपि मे मम विनाशो न स्यात्, कुतः ? अनाश्रयात्, आश्रयस्याधारस्याभावात् । आत्मा हि गुणक्रियाजात्याद्यन्यतमत्वाभावादनाश्रयः, निरवयवत्वाच्च नापि घटवदाश्रयः । अत आश्रयनाशादप्यात्मनो न नाशः । आत्मनो मरणादिप्रतीतिस्तु देहाद्युपाधिकृता । तदुक्तं सूत्रकृता— "चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वा"दिति । अस्य चार्थो विद्यारण्यगुरुभिरधिकरणरत्नमालायां दर्शितः ।

"जीवस्य जन्ममरणे वपुषो वात्मनो हि ते ।

जातो मे पुत्र इत्युक्तेर्जातकर्मादिभिस्तथा[२] " ॥

इति पूर्वपक्षे प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तमाह—

"मुख्ये ते वपुषो भाक्ते जीवस्यैते अपेक्ष्य हि ।

जातकर्म च लोकोक्तिर्जीवापेतेति शास्त्रतः" ॥इति ।

ततस्त्रिविधनाशाभावान्नित्य एवात्मेति तस्य ब्रह्मणोऽभेदः[३] सम्यग् घटत इति भावः ॥४ ॥

हेतुसंयोगादात्मनो न नाश इति द्वितीयं पक्षं प्रपञ्चयति—

न शोषप्लोषविक्लेदच्छेदाश्चित्रभसो मम ।

सत्यैरप्यनिलाग्न्यम्भः शस्त्रैः किमुत कल्पितैः ॥५ ॥

न शोषेति । चित्रभसश्चिदाकाशस्य ममात्मनोऽनिलेन वायुना न शोषः शोषणं पत्रफलादेरिव भवति, नाप्यग्निना प्लोषो दाहः पटादेरिव भवति, नाप्यम्भसा जलेन शस्यादेरिव विक्लेदः क्लेदनं भवति, नापि शस्त्रेणायुधेनेक्षुदण्डादेरिव च्छेदो द्वैधीभाव आत्मनो भवति,

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१. चिद्रूपस्यात्मनः इति पा. २. -दितस्तथा इति पा. ३. -णाभेदः इति पा.

आकाशस्येवात्मनो निरवयवत्वेन वाय्वादिभिः सम्बन्धाभावादित्यर्थः। व्यावहारिकसत्यस्य भूताकाशस्यैव हि निरवयवत्वेनासङ्गत्वादाकाशतुल्यसत्यैरप्यनिलादिभिः शोषादयो न भवन्ति, आत्मनि मायाकल्पिततत्वेन मिथ्याभूतैर्वाय्वादिभिर्वस्तुतोऽद्वितीयस्यासङ्गस्यात्मनः[१] शोषादयो न सम्भवन्तीति किमु वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः। तदुक्तं भगवता— "अच्छेद्योऽय"-मित्यादिना[२] ॥५ ॥

ननु प्रत्यगात्मा परिच्छिन्न एवानुभूयते, अहमिहास्मीति प्रतीतेः। ब्रह्म च सर्वगतम्, "नित्यं विभुम्[३]" इत्यादिश्रुतेः। अतो नायं ब्रह्मेत्याशङ्क्यात्मनः सर्वगतत्वं युक्त्या सम्भावयन्नाह—

आभारूपस्य विश्वस्य भानं भासंनिधेर्विना।
कदाचिन्नावकल्पेत भा चाहं तेन सर्वगः ॥६ ॥

आभारूपस्येति। आभारूपस्याचिद्रूपस्य, जडस्येत्यर्थः, विश्वस्य जगतो भानं प्रकाशो भासंनिधेर्विना भासंनिधिं विना, चैतन्यसम्बन्धं विनेत्यर्थः, कदाचित् कदाचिदपि नावकल्पेत, न सम्भवेत्, भाचैतन्यरूपश्चाहं प्रत्यगात्मा, तेन जडसर्वप्रपञ्चभासकत्वेन प्रत्यगात्मा सर्वगः, सर्वगतो भवामीत्यर्थः, बहुयोजनदूरवर्तिचन्द्रसूर्यमण्डलम्, ततोऽप्यतिदूरवर्ति ध्रुवादि नक्षत्राणि च प्रत्यगात्मनो भासन्ते, तच्च भानं जडानां तेषां स्वतो न सम्भवति; किन्तु स्वप्रकाशरूपात्मचैतन्यसम्बन्धबलेनैव तद् वक्तव्यम्, स्वतोऽप्रकाशस्य घटादेः स्वप्रकाशदीपादिसम्बन्धबलेनैव प्रकाशदर्शनात्।

अथ[४] प्रत्यागात्मात्रैव तिष्ठेत् कथं ध्रुवादिना सम्बध्येत, ततो ध्रुवादिभासकत्वात् प्रत्यगात्मा सर्वगतः, परिच्छिन्नताप्रतीतिश्चात्मनोऽभिव्यञ्जकोपाधिपरिच्छेदाद्भ्रान्त्योपपद्यते। तदुक्तं ब्रह्मगीतायाम्—

"स्वयं भातुमशक्तं हि जडात्मकमिदं जगत्।
चित्सम्बन्धबलेनैव खलु भाति न चान्यथा ॥
स्वाभिव्यञ्जकसङ्कोचात् सङ्कोचप्रतिभात्मनः।
न स्वरूपेण चिद्रूपः सर्वव्यापी सदा खलु" ॥इति।

ततो जीवात्मा ब्रह्मैवेति भावः ॥६ ॥

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१. –सत्यस्यापि नभसो निरवयवत्वेन परमतेऽसङ्गत्वात्, आकाशतुल्यैः सत्यैरप्यनिलादिभिः शोषादयो न भवन्ति, परमार्थसत्यत्वात् पुनः स्वस्मिन् कल्पितैर्वाय्वादिभिः, इति पा.

२. –क्तं गीतायाम्, अच्छेद्योऽयमदाह्योऽयमक्लेद्योऽशोष्य एव च। नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थाणुरचलोऽयं सनातनः॥ इति। इति पा.

३. "विभुं सर्वगतं नित्यम्", इति पा. ४. यदि इति पा.

ननु जीवस्य ब्रह्माभेदोऽसङ्गतः, ब्रह्मण[४] एवासिद्धेः। देशकालवस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्यं वस्तु हि ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते। न च तत् सम्भवति, कालाकाशादेर्द्वितीयस्य विद्यमानत्वेन वस्तु परिच्छेदाभावस्यासिद्धेः, न चाकाशादेर्ब्रह्मण्यारोपितत्वेन मिथ्यात्वात् तेन तस्य न द्विती यत्वमिति वाच्यम्, आकाशादेरध्यस्तत्वे मानाभावात्। न च "आत्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः" इति श्रुतिस्तत्र मानमिति वाच्यम्, तत्राकाशादेर्ब्रह्मकार्यतामात्रप्रतीतेः, इत्याशङ्क्य ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वसिद्धय आकाशादेरध्यस्तत्वं साधयति—

न हि भानादृते सत्त्वं नर्ते भानं चितोऽचितः।

चित्सम्भेदोऽपि नाध्यासादृते तेनाहमद्वयः ॥७॥

न हीति। भानादृते प्रकाशं विना पदार्थस्य सत्त्वं सद्भावो नास्ति, अप्रकाशमान शशविषाणादेः सत्त्वादर्शनादित्यर्थः। ततः किं तत्राह, नर्त इत्यादिना, अचितो जडस्य चित ऋते चैतन्यस्य सम्बन्धं विना भानं प्रकाशो नास्ति, स्वतो भानवत्त्वे जडत्वाभावप्रसङ्गा दित्यर्थः। ततोऽपि किं तत्राह, चित्संभेद इत्यादिना, चित्संभेदोऽपि चैतन्यसम्बन्धोऽप्य ध्यासादृते चित्यारोपितत्वं विना जडस्य न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। अयं भावः— चिज्जडयोराध्यासिकसम्बन्धातिरिक्तं सम्बन्धं वदन् वादी प्रष्टव्यः, किं तयोः सम्बन्धः? संयोगः, उत समवायः, अथ तादात्म्यम्, अथवा विषयविषयिभाव इति।

नाद्यः, चितोऽद्रव्यत्वेन संयोगानुपपत्तेः, गुणाश्रयस्यैव द्रव्यत्वात्, चितो निर्गुणत्वात्।

नापि समवायः, चिज्जडयोर्गुणगुण्यादिष्वन्यतमत्वाभावात्।

ननु चिज्जडयोः कार्यकारणभावात् तन्तुपटयोरिव समवायोऽस्त्विति चेत्, न, तन्तु पटयोः समवायेऽवयवावयविताया एव प्रयोजकत्वेन कार्यकारणभावस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्, अन्यथा तुरीपटयोरपि समवायप्रसङ्गात्, अवयवावयवितायाश्च दृग्दृश्ययोरभावात्।

नापि तादात्म्यम्, परस्परविलक्षणयोस्तयोस्तादात्म्यासम्भवात्।

नापि विषयविषयिभावः, तस्य मूलसम्बन्धपूर्वकत्वात्, तदसम्भवस्य चोक्तत्वात्, अन्यथातिप्रसङ्गात्, तदुक्तं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिः—

"न संकरो नापि च संयुतिस्तयो

र्न चास्ति तद्वत् समवायसम्भवः।

अतो न चिच्चैत्यसमन्वयं प्रति

प्रतीयते काचन मूलसङ्गतिः"॥ इति।

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४. वस्तुतो ब्रह्मण इति पा.

ततस्तयोराध्यासिक एव सम्बन्ध इति वाच्यम्, तथा च जडपदार्थभानान्यथानुपपत्तिरेवाकाशादिरध्यस्तत्वे प्रमाणम्, तदपि तैरेवोक्तम्,

"ततो वियन्मुख्यमदो जगज्जडं

चिदात्मनोऽस्यैव विवर्त इष्यताम् ।

अनाद्यविद्यापटसंवृतात्मन-

स्तदोपलभ्यत्वममुष्य कल्प्यते" ॥ इति ।

तेनाकाशादेरध्यस्तत्वेनाहं प्रत्यगभिन्नः परमात्माद्वयः, अद्वितीय इत्यर्थः । ततश्च ब्रह्मणो वस्तुपरिच्छेदाभावेन त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्यत्वं सिद्धमित्यर्थः । तदुक्तं विद्यारण्यगुरुभिः पञ्चकोशविवेके—

"देशकालान्यवस्तूनां कल्पितत्वाच्च मायया ।

न देशादिकृतोऽन्तोऽस्ति ब्रह्मानन्त्यं स्फुटं ततः" ॥ इति ॥७ ॥

ननु स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहं काणोऽहं बधिरोऽहं मूकोऽहं बुभुक्षितोऽहं पिपासितोऽहं मन्ताहं निश्चितोऽहम्, इति देहादिरूपेणानुभूयमानस्य प्रतीचः कथं चिदेकरसब्रह्मता, इत्याशङ्क्य देहादीनामनात्मत्वं प्रत्येकं साधयति—

न देहो नेन्द्रियं चाहं न प्राणो न मनो न धीः ।

ममतापरिरब्धत्वादाक्रीडत्वादिदं धियः ॥८ ॥

न देह इति । देहः सशिरस्कः पिण्डः, इन्द्रियं द्विविधम्, ज्ञानसाधनं चक्षुरादि, कर्मसाधनं पाण्यादि च, प्राणः पञ्चवृत्तिः, मनः संशयात्मकम्, धीर्बुद्धिर्निश्चयात्मिका, अहंशब्दस्य देहादिभिः प्रत्येकं सम्बन्धः, एते देहादयो बुद्धिपर्यन्ताः पञ्चापि पदार्था अनात्मान इत्यर्थः । कुत इत्यत आह, ममतेत्यादिना । ममतापरिरब्धत्वादिदं धियः, आक्रीडत्वाच्च, ममतया ममेतिबुद्ध्या परिरब्धत्वादालिङ्गितत्वाद् विषयीकृतत्वादिति यावत् । इदं धिय इदं बुद्धेः, आक्रीडत्वाल्लीलास्थानत्वादिदंबुद्धिविषयत्वादित्यर्थः । अत्रेदमनुमानं विवक्षितम् । देहादयः प्रत्येकमनात्मानः, ममताबुद्धिविषयत्वादिदंबुद्धिविषयत्वाच्च, घटादिवदिति । देहोऽनात्मा, रूपादिमत्त्वात्, घटवत्, इन्द्रियाण्यनात्मानः, करणत्वात्, कुठारवत्, प्राणोऽनात्मा, वायुत्वात्, बाह्यवायुवत्, देहोऽहमित्यादिप्रतीत्यभावाच्चानात्मत्वं पञ्चानाम् । कृशोऽहमित्यादिप्रतीतिस्तु रक्तः स्फटिक इत्यादिप्रतीतिवदात्मनि देहादिधर्माध्यासादप्युपपद्यते, नापि तत्संघातस्याप्यात्मत्वम्, अनात्मसमुदायस्तत्संघातोऽपि नात्मा, अनात्मत्वात्, गृहादिवदिति भावः ॥८ ॥

नन्वहङ्कारस्यात्मत्वमस्तु, तस्य ममेदंबुद्धिविषयत्वाभावात्, इत्याशङ्क्य सुषुप्त्यादावात्मनि विद्यमानेऽप्यहङ्कारस्याभावान्न तयोरैक्यमित्यभिप्रेत्य प्रकारान्तरेण तयोर्भेदं साधयति—

साक्षी सर्वान्वितः प्रेयानहं नाहं कदाचन।

परिणामपरिच्छेदपरितापैरुपप्लवात् ॥९ ॥

साक्षीति। साक्षी चिद्रूपोऽन्तःकरणपरिणामरागद्वेषादिद्रष्टा, सर्वान्वितः सर्वत्र घटपटादिष्वन्वितः, घटः स्फुरति, पटः स्फुरति, इति स्फुरणस्य सर्वत्रानुगतत्वेनानुभवात्, प्रेयान् प्रियतम आनन्दरूपः, तस्यैव प्रेयस्त्वात्, अनुभूयते ह्यात्मनः प्रियतमत्वम्, अहं सर्वदा भूयासं न कदाचिन्नाभूवमित्यात्मनि सर्वेषां प्रार्थनादर्शनादित्यर्थः। एवंभूतोऽहं प्रत्यगात्मा कदाचन कदाचिदपि नाहं, नाहङ्कारो भवामीत्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह, परिणामेत्यादिना, अहङ्कारस्य परिणामपरिच्छेदपरितापैः। परिणामो रागद्वेषादिपरिणामः, परिच्छेदः परिमितत्वम्, परितापो दुःखादिः, एतैस्त्रिभिरुपप्लवः सम्बन्धः, तस्मादित्यर्थः। द्रष्टृदृश्यभावेन सर्वगतत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वाद्याकारेणानन्दरूपित्वदुःखित्वाकारेण चानुभूयमानत्वादहङ्कारात्मनोर्भेदः स्फुट इत्यर्थः। किमिति तर्हि तयोर्भेदः सर्वैर्नानुभूयत इति चेत्, अहङ्कारात्मनोस्तप्तायःपिण्डवदविवेकेन दृढमेकतयाऽध्यसनान्नानुभूयत इति गृहाणेत्यभिप्रायः ॥९ ॥

नन्वेवमपि संसारिण आत्मनः कथं नित्यमुक्तब्रह्मता। न च संसारोऽहङ्कारस्यैव नात्मन इति वाच्यम्, आत्माहङ्कारोभयसन्निधाने प्रतीयमानस्य संसारस्याहङ्कारैकसम्बन्धित्वे मानाभावात्, इत्याशङ्क्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावेव तत्र मानमित्याह—

सुप्तेऽहमि न दृश्यन्ते दुःखदोषप्रवृत्तयः।

अतस्तस्यैव संसारो न मे संसर्तृसाक्षिणः ॥१० ॥

सुप्तेऽहमीति। अहम्यहङ्कारे सुप्त उपरते सति सुषुप्तिमूर्च्छादौ [१]दुःखदोषप्रवृत्तयः, दुःखं च, दोषा रागादयश्च, तत्कार्यभूता प्रवृत्तिश्च, दुःखदोषप्रवृत्तयः, ता न दृश्यन्ते यतोऽतस्तस्यैवाहङ्कारस्य संसारः, संसर्तृसाक्षिणः संसर्तुरहङ्कारस्य साक्षिणो मे मम प्रत्यगात्मनो न संसार इत्यर्थः। अहङ्कारे सति जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोः संसारदर्शनात्। तदभावे च सुषुप्त्यादौ केवल आत्मनि संसारादर्शनात्। अहङ्कारसम्बन्ध्येव संसार आत्मन्यपि तदविवेकात् प्रतीयते, यथा दाहकत्वमग्निसम्बन्ध्येव सत् तदविवेकादयस्यापि प्रतीयते। यथा वा रक्तिमा जपाकुसुमसम्बन्ध्येव सन्नविवेकात् स्फटिकेऽपि प्रतीयते, तद्वदात्मन्यप्यहङ्कारोपाधिवशादेव संसारः प्रतीयते, न स्वतः, सुषुप्त्यादावदर्शनात्। तदुक्तं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिः—

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१. –र्च्छयोर्दुः — इति पा.

"कर्त्रादिसंनिधिबलेन तवापि कर्तृ-

भोक्तृप्रमातृवपुरापतति भ्रमेण ।

तद्बुद्धिसंश्रयमनात्मगतं प्रतीचि

शुद्धेऽपि पश्यति तमःपटलावृताक्षः" ॥इति ।

अत आत्मा नित्यमुक्तं ब्रह्मैवेत्यभिप्रायः ॥१० ॥

नन्वेवमप्यात्मनो जाग्रदाद्यवस्थावत्त्वं वक्तव्यम्, अहङ्कारस्य सुषुप्तावभावेन सुषुप्त्यवस्थावत्त्वानुपपत्तौ जाग्रत्स्वप्नावस्थाद्वयसम्बन्धित्वस्याप्यनुपपत्तेस्तासां तिसृणामप्येकाश्रयत्वनियमादित्याशङ्क्याहङ्कारस्य सुषुप्तौ संस्काररूपेण वर्तमानत्वात् तस्यैव सुषुप्तिर्नात्मनः, तस्य सुषुप्तिसाक्षित्वात् । ततो जाग्रत्स्वप्नावप्यहङ्कारस्यैवेत्यभिप्रेत्याह—

सुप्तः सुप्तिं न जानाति नाऽसुप्ते स्वप्नजागरौ ।

जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तीनां साक्ष्यतोऽहमतद्दशः ॥११ ॥

सुप्त इति । यः सुप्तः सुप्तिं न जानाति, न वेत्ति, सोऽहङ्कार एव सुप्तः सुषुप्त्यवस्थावान् नैवात्मा, कुतः ? सुषुप्तितात्कालिकाज्ञानसाक्षितया जागरूकत्वादित्यर्थः । ततश्चासुप्ते सुषुप्त्यवस्थारहिते प्रत्यगात्मनि स्वप्नजागरौ न भवतः, तयोः सुषुप्त्यवस्थासमानाश्रयत्वादित्यर्थः । हेत्वन्तरमप्याह, जाग्रदित्यादिना, यतो जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तीनां साक्षी द्रष्टा, अतोऽहमात्मा, अतद्दशः, ता जाग्रदाद्या दशा अवस्था यस्य स तद्दशः, तद्दशो न भवतीत्यतद्दशः, जाग्रदाद्यवस्थारहित इत्यर्थः । अत्रेदमनुमानं विवक्षितम्, आत्मा जाग्रदाद्यवस्थावान् न भवति, जाग्रदाद्यवस्था- साक्षित्वात्, यो यत्साक्षी न स तद्धर्मवान्, यथा घटसाक्षी न घटधर्मवानिति । तदुक्तमन्वर्थं नाम सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिः—

"तिस्रोऽपि चिद्घनतनोस्तव दृश्यभूता

दूरे चकासति मतेर्बहिरेव तावत् ।

आविस्तिरोभवनधर्मतया ह्यवस्थाः

कः संकरो विमलचिद्वपुषस्तवाभिः" ॥इति ॥११ ॥

जाग्रदाद्यवस्थालक्षणपर्यालोचनयापि नात्मनोऽवस्थासम्बन्ध इत्याह—

विज्ञानविरतिः सुप्तिस्तज्जन्म स्वप्नजागरौ ।

तत्साक्षिणः कथं मे स्युर्नित्यज्ञानस्य ते त्रयः ॥१२ ॥

विज्ञानेति। विज्ञानविरतिर्विज्ञानस्य विशेषज्ञानस्य विरतिरुपरतिः सुप्तिरित्युच्यते, तज्जन्म तस्य विशेषज्ञानस्य जन्मोत्पत्ति, स्वप्नजागरावित्युच्येते, तत्रापि वासनामयप्रपञ्च-विज्ञानं स्वप्नः, स्थूलप्रपञ्चविज्ञानं जाग्रदिति विभाग इत्यर्थः। ततः किं तत्राह, तत्साक्षिण इत्या-दिना। नित्यज्ञानस्यालुप्तचिद्रूस्य तत्साक्षिण उक्तलक्षणसुषुप्त्यादिसाक्षिणो मे ममात्मनस्ते त्रयः सुषुप्तिस्वप्नजागराः कथं स्युः, न कथंचिदित्यर्थः। अयं भावः— सुषुप्त्यवस्थायां तावत् सुषुप्तितात्कालिकाज्ञानाभावभासकं किञ्चिच्चैतन्यमङ्गीकार्यं सर्वैरपि, अन्यथा उत्थितस्य पुरुषस्य सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषमिति सुषुप्तितात्कालिकाज्ञानपरामर्शानुपपत्तेस्त-च्चैतन्यं न जन्यम्, मनश्चक्षुरादेः सुप्त्यन्तःपातित्वादनन्तं च तदजन्यभावस्य नित्यत्वनियमात्, तच्चैतन्यमस्माभिरात्मेत्युच्यते। तथा च कथमनादिनित्यज्ञानस्वरूपस्यात्मनो ज्ञानोपरमरूपा सुषुप्तिः, ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरूपौ स्वप्नजागरौ च स्युः, अहङ्कारस्य तु जन्यवृत्तिरूपज्ञानाश्रयत्वात् तत्त्रयमुपपद्यते। ततश्चात्मा जाग्रदाद्यवस्थारहित इति ॥१२॥

इदानीमात्मनो निर्विकारब्रह्माभेदाय षड्भावविकारराहित्यं साधयति—

षड्विकारवतां वेत्ता निर्विकारोऽहमन्यथा।

तद्विकारानुसन्धानं सर्वथा नावकल्पते ॥१३॥

षड्विकारेति। षड्विकारवतां षड्भावविकारवतां, षट् च ते भावविकाराश्च षड्भावविकाराः, जायते, अस्ति, वर्धते, विपरिणमते, अपक्षीयते, विनश्यति, इत्युक्ताः। ते येषां सन्ति ते षड्भावविकारवन्तस्तेषां बाह्यघटादीनाम्, आन्तरबुद्ध्यादीनां च, वेत्ता ज्ञाता-हमात्मा निर्विकारो विकाररहितो भवामि। आत्मा हि बाह्यान्तरवस्तूनामुत्पत्त्यादिविकारान् जानाति, अतो निर्विकारो भवितुमर्हति, यो यज्जानाति न स तद्धर्मवानिति व्याप्तेर्लोक-सिद्धत्वादित्यर्थः। तदुक्तं वार्तिककृता—

"नर्ते स्याद्विक्रियां दुःखी साक्षिता का विकारिणः।

धीविक्रियासहस्राणां साक्ष्यतोऽहमविक्रियः" ॥ इति।

विपक्षे दोषमाह— अन्यथेत्यादिना। अन्यथा विकारसाक्षिणोऽपि विकारित्वे तद्वि कारानुसन्धानं, तेषां विकारिवस्तूनां ये विकारास्तेषामनुसन्धानं सर्वथा सर्वप्रकारेणापि नाव-कल्पते, न सम्भवतीत्यर्थः। अयमभिसन्धिः— आत्मनोऽपि विकारित्वे किमात्मन इतरेषां च विकारा आत्मना ज्ञायन्ते, उतेतरैः, नोभयथापि, विकारिवस्तुनो मृदादिवज्जडत्वनियमा-दिति ॥१३॥

किञ्च, विकारिवस्तुनो विकाराणां च किं भेद उताभेदः? नाद्यः, भिन्नयोर्गवाश्वयोरिव विकारविकारिभावानुपपत्तेः, इत्यभिप्रेत्य द्वितीयपक्षे दूषणमाह—

तेन तेन हि रूपेण जायते लीयते मुहुः ।
विकारि वस्तु तस्यैषामनुसन्धातृता कुतः ॥१४॥

तेनेति। तेन तेन रूपेणोत्पत्त्यादिविकाररूपेण तदभिन्नं विकारि वस्त्वपि जायत उत्पद्यते, मुहुः शश्वल्लीयते, नश्यति च, तयोरभेदादित्यर्थः। हि यस्मादेवं तस्मात् तस्य विकारिवस्तुन एषां विकाराणामनुसन्धातृता कुतः, अनुसन्धानं कुतः, न कुतोऽपि भवेदित्यर्थः। तत्तद्विकाररूपेण तदा तदा नश्यतो विकारिवस्तुनः कथं कालान्तरीयं विकारानुसन्धानं घटते, न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः ॥१४॥

नन्वात्मा स्वयं विकारी सन्नप्यात्मन इतरेषां च विकारान् विजानातु, न च तस्य विकारित्वाविशेषे कथं स्वेतरपरिज्ञानमिति वाच्यम्, शिलात्वाविशेषेऽपि रत्नस्य स्वभावविशेषेण स्वेतरावभासकत्ववदात्मनोऽपि स्वभावविशेषेण स्वेतरविकारानुसन्धानोपपत्तेः। न च तेन तेन विकारेण साकं नष्टस्य कथं सर्वविकारानुसन्धानमिति वाच्यम्, तस्य विकारिण आत्मनो विकारैरत्यन्ताभेदस्यानङ्गीकारात्, किं त्वीषद्भेदघटिताभेदस्य तादात्म्यस्यैव तन्तुपटयोरिवाङ्गीकारात्, इत्याशङ्क्य, एवमप्यात्मन आद्यन्तविकारद्वयानुसन्धानं न सम्भवतीत्याह—

न च स्वजन्म नाशं वा द्रष्टुमर्हति कश्चन ।
तौ हि प्रागुत्तराभावचरमप्रथमक्षणौ ॥१५॥

न चेति। कश्चन कश्चिन्निपुणोऽपि स्वजन्म स्वोत्पत्तिं नाशं ध्वंसं वा द्रष्टुं ज्ञातुं नार्हति, न शक्नोतीत्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह— तौ हीत्यादिना, हि यस्मात् तौ जन्मनाशौ प्रागुत्तराभावचरमप्रथमक्षणौ, प्रागुत्तरौ यावभावौ प्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावौ तयोर्यौ चरमप्रथमक्षणौ तौ प्रागुत्तराभावचरमप्रथमक्षणौ, प्रागभावचरमक्षण उत्पत्तिर्वस्तुनः प्रध्वंसाभावप्रथमक्षणो नाश इत्यर्थः। यस्माज्जन्मनाशौ प्रागुत्तराभावचरमप्रथमक्षणौ तस्मात्[1] स्वजन्म नाशं वा द्रष्टुं नार्हतीति सम्बन्धः। इदमत्राकूतम्— आत्मा हि स्वसमानकालिकवस्त्वेव जानातीति वक्तव्यम्, दीप इव स्वसमानकालिकपदार्थावभासकः, तथा चावस्थानसमयेऽविद्यमानयोः प्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावयोः परिज्ञानाभावे कथं प्रागभावचरमक्षणरूपं स्वजन्म[2], प्रध्वंसाभावप्रथमक्षणरूपं नाशं च, जानीयात्, न कथंचिदपीत्यर्थः। तयोश्चासिद्धौ मध्यमवर्तिविकाराणामप्यसिद्धिरेव। तेषामपि विकाराणामुत्पत्तिनाशसमानाश्रयत्वनियमात्। तदुक्तं वाक्यवृत्तौ भाष्यकारैः—

"देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणाहङ्कृतिभ्यो विलक्षणः ।
प्रोज्झिताशेषषड्भावविकारस्त्वंपदाभिधः" ॥इति ।

ततश्चात्मा निर्विकारत्वाद् ब्रह्मैवेत्यर्थः ॥१५॥

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१. –शावीदृशो तस्मात्, इति पा.   २. जन्म इति पा.

ननु पूर्वोक्तं सर्वं वृथा, आत्मन उक्तस्वरूपब्रह्मत्वज्ञाने प्रयोजनाभावात् । न च संसार निवृत्तिरात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वज्ञाने प्रयोजनमिति वाच्यम्, तन्निवृत्तेरसम्भवात् । संसारो ह्यात्मन्य हङ्कारोपाधिना प्रतीयमानः कर्तृत्वादिभिः[१], स च न ज्ञानेन निवर्तयितुं शक्यः, तस्यात्मनि सोपाधिकभ्रमत्वात्, सोपाधिकभ्रमस्य च यावदुपाध्यवस्थानम्, तत्त्वज्ञानेऽप्यवस्थानात्, लोके सोपाधिकभ्रमस्य प्रतिबिम्बचलनादेर्यावदुपाधिचलनं प्रतीतेः । न चोपाधेरहङ्कारस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानेन निवृत्तौ तत्प्रयुक्तस्यात्मनि प्रतीयमानस्य कर्तृत्वादेरपि निवृत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तस्य मूलाज्ञाने सति निवृत्तेरसम्भवात् । न च मूलाज्ञानस्याप्यात्मनि विद्यमानस्य ब्रह्मज्ञाना-न्निवृत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, तस्य कल्पकाभावेनाकल्पिततया ज्ञानेन निवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वात्, अन्यथाज्ञानस्यानवस्थानप्रसङ्गात्, इत्याशङ्क्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वसिद्धये कल्पितत्वं वक्तुं तस्यात्मनि वस्तुतोऽसम्भवमाह—

न प्रकाशेऽहमित्युक्तिर्यत्प्रकाशैकबन्धना ।

स्वप्रकाशं तमात्मानमप्रकाशः कथं स्पृशेत् ॥१६ ॥

न प्रकाशेति । अहं न प्रकाशेन भामीत्युक्तिर्वचनं यत्प्रकाशैकबन्धना, यस्य प्रकाशो यत्प्रकाशः, स्वरूपप्रकाश एक एव निबन्धनं निमित्तं यस्याः सा तथोक्ता, न प्रकाश इति व्यवहारस्य प्रकाशैकनिबन्धनत्वात्, स्वप्रकाशानुभवनिमित्तत्वादित्यर्थः । तं स्वप्रकाशं स्वय मेव भासमानमात्मानमप्रकाशोऽज्ञानं कथं स्पृशेदावृणुयात्, न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः ।

अयं भावः । आत्मा सर्वदा स्वयंभासमानः सर्वं भासयति, स कथमज्ञानेन प्रकाश विरोधिना स्पृश्येत, न हि खरतरकिरणशाली दिनकरस्तमसा स्पृश्यमानो दृश्यते, तत् कस्य हेतोः, प्रकाशाप्रकाशयोर्विरोधात्, तथा चाज्ञानस्यात्मनि युक्त्यसहत्वान्न परमार्थतः सम्भव इति ॥१६ ॥

ननु कथं तर्हि न प्रकाश इत्यात्मन्यज्ञानानुभव इत्याशङ्क्य सूर्ये पेचकादीनाम न्धकारप्रतीतिवद्भीत्या[२]प्युपपद्यत इत्याह—

तथाप्याभाति कोऽप्येष विचाराभावजीवनः ।

अवश्यायश्चिदाकाशे विचारार्कोदयावधिः ॥१७ ॥

तथापीति । यद्यपि वस्तुत आत्मन्यज्ञानं न सम्भवति, तथाप्येषोऽप्रकाश अवश्यायो नीहारः, अवश्यायवदवश्यायः, आवरकत्वात्, चिदाकाशे चित्प्रकाश आत्मन्याभातीति सम्बन्धः[३] ।

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१. त्वादिः इति पा. २. -द्भ्रान्त्या- इति पा. ३. योजना इति पा.

नन्वज्ञानस्य वस्तुतोऽसत्त्वे कथं प्रत्यक्षप्रतीतिः, न ह्यसतः शशविषाणादेः प्रत्यक्ष प्रतीतिरस्ति, तत्राह कोऽपीति, कोऽपि सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयोऽप्रकाशस्यासत्सद्विल क्षणत्वाङ्गीकारान्न प्रत्यक्षप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः।

नन्वेवमप्यप्रकाशस्यात्मन्यनुभवो नोपपद्यते, विरोधादिति चेत्, न, तथा हि किं जड वस्त्वप्रकाशविरोधि, उत स्वप्रकाशरूप आत्मा? नाद्यः, जडाप्रकाशयोः परस्परविरोधा सम्भवात्। नापि द्वितीयः, तस्य विरोधिनि स्वप्रकाश आत्मन्यवस्थानानुपपत्तेः। न चाहं न प्रकाश इत्यज्ञानसाधकस्य तस्य नाज्ञानविरोधित्वमिति वाच्यम्, आत्मस्वरूपस्य प्रकाशस्या विरोधित्वेऽन्यस्यापि विरोधिनोऽभावात् कदापि निवृत्तिर्न स्यात्, तत्राह विचारार्कोदयावधि. रिति। विचारो विचारजन्यं ज्ञानमेवार्कः सूर्यः, तमोनिवर्तकत्वात्, तस्योदय उत्पत्तिः, सावधिः स्थितिर्मर्यादा यस्याप्रकाशस्य सः, विचारर्कोदयावधिरित्यर्थः। केवलात्मनोऽविरोधित्वेऽप्य खण्डाकारवृत्त्यारूढात्मचैतन्यस्य तन्निवर्तकत्वोपपत्तेः, केवलसूर्यकिरणस्यादग्धृत्वेन तृणादि भासकत्वेऽपि सूर्यकान्तसंयुक्तस्य तस्य दग्धृत्वदर्शनादिति भावः। किमिति तर्हि वाक्यजन्या खण्डाकारवृत्तौ सत्यामपि सर्वेषामात्माज्ञानं न निवर्तत इत्याशङ्क्याह— विचाराभावजीवन इति। विचाराभाव एव [illegible] भाव एव। जीवनमवस्थितिहेतुर्यस्याप्रकाशस्य सः, विचाराभावजीवन इत्यर्थः। वाक्यजन्याप्य खण्डाकारवृत्तिरसम्भावनादिभिः प्रतिबद्धा सती नाज्ञानं निवर्तयति, यथा मणिमन्त्रादिभिः प्रति बद्धोऽग्निः संयुक्तमपि तृणादिकं न दहति, तद्वत्। तदुक्तं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिः—

"पुरुषापराधमलिना धिषणा निरवद्यचक्षुरुदयापि यथा।
न फलाय भृष्टविषया भवति श्रुतिसम्भवापि तु तथात्मनि धीः" ॥इति।

यदा तु सम्यग्विचारेणासम्भावनादयो निवर्तन्ते, तदा अप्रतिबद्धा सत्यज्ञानं निव र्तयति, यथा मण्यादिप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तावग्निस्तृणादिकं दहति तद्वत्। एतदपि तैरेवोक्तम्—

"पुरुषापराधविगमे तु पुनः प्रतिबन्धकव्युदसनात् सफला।
मणिमन्त्रयोरपगमे तु यथा सति पावकाद्भवति धूमलता" ॥इति।

तथा चाज्ञानस्यानिर्वचनीयस्य कल्पितत्वेन ज्ञानान्निवृत्त्युपपत्तिः। न च तस्य कल्प काभावोऽज्ञानस्य, लोके दीपवत्, भाट्टपक्षे स्फुरणवत्, गुरुमते संवेदनवत्, गुरुबौद्धव्यति रिक्तमते भेदवच्च, स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वान्नाप्यनवस्था, अज्ञानान्तरस्यानङ्गीकारात्। तथा चाज्ञानस्य ज्ञाननिवृत्तौ मूलोच्छेदेनाहङ्कारस्य निवृत्तिसम्भवादात्मनि प्रतीयमानस्याहङ्कारो पाधिप्रयुक्तस्य कर्तृत्वादिरूपसंसारस्यापि निवृत्तिर्भवतीति प्रत्यगात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वज्ञानं सफल मिति भावः ॥१७॥

ननु ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्याज्ञानकल्पिततया परमार्थतोऽसत्त्वे कर्मकाण्डाद्यप्रामाण्यं स्यात्, स हि स्वर्गकामादेर्यागादिकर्तव्यतां बोधयति, तच्च नियोगस्यापूर्वस्य नियोज्यस्य पुरुषस्य नियोगविषयस्य यागस्य, नियोगफलस्य स्वर्गस्य च परमार्थतोऽसत्त्वेऽनुपपन्नं[१] स्यात्, ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य परमार्थतोऽसत्त्व उपनिषदप्रामाण्यं च स्यात्, तत्रापि हि मोक्षकामस्य "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः" इत्यादिना श्रवणादिकर्तव्यता बोध्यते, तस्याप्यप्रामाण्यमयुक्तम्, कर्मकाण्डोपनिषदेकदेशयोरपि ब्रह्मवाक्येन सह सम्प्रदायस्य तुल्यत्वात्, इत्याशङ्क्य किं तत्त्वज्ञानोत्तरकाले कर्मकाण्डाद्यप्रामाण्यमापाद्यते, किं वा ततः पूर्वकाले ? नाद्यः, तदुत्तरकालं तदप्रामाण्यस्य गार्हस्थ्ये ब्रह्मचारिधर्मविदकश्रुतेरिव संन्यासाश्रम कालेऽग्निहोत्रादिश्रुतेरिव चेष्टत्वादित्यभिप्रेत्य द्वितीयं प्रत्याह—

आत्माज्ञानमहानिद्राजृम्भितेऽस्मिन् जगन्मये ।
दीर्घस्वप्ने स्फुरन्त्येते स्वर्गमोक्षादिविभ्रमाः ॥१८॥

आत्मेति । आत्माज्ञानमहानिद्राजृम्भिते, आत्माज्ञानं प्रत्यगात्माश्रयविषयमज्ञानं तदेव महती निद्रा, अनादिकालमारभ्य प्रवृत्तत्वात्, स्वरूपावरणपूर्वकविपरीतहेतुत्वाच्च, ततो जृम्भित उत्पन्ने जगन्मये जगद्रूपेऽस्मिन्ननुभूयमाने दीर्घस्वप्ने तत्त्वज्ञानपर्यन्तमनुवर्तमान एते स्वर्गमोक्षादिविभ्रमाः स्वर्गमोक्षावादी येषां विभ्रमाणां ते तथा, स्वर्गशब्दस्तत्कामनियोज्यनियोगतद्विषययागादेरप्युपलक्षणम्, मोक्षशब्दश्च तत्साधनज्ञानश्रवणादिनियोगादेरप्युपलक्षणम्, आदिशब्दो लौकिकव्यवहारानुकूलपुत्रमित्रादिसङ्ग्रहार्थः, मोक्षस्य बन्धसापेक्षत्वा द्बन्धस्य च मिथ्यात्वाद्बन्धसापेक्षमोक्षस्यापि विभ्रमत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । स्फुरन्ति, स्फुरन्त्येव, ननु स्फुरन्तीत्यर्थः । अयं[२] भावः— तत्त्वज्ञानात् पूर्वकाले व्यावहारिकसत्यस्य सर्वस्य जगतो नियोज्यनियोगादेः सत्त्वेन प्रबोधात् पूर्वं स्वप्नादाविव सर्वव्यावहारोपपत्तेर्न कर्मकाण्डाद्यप्रामाण्यम्, तस्य व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यस्य सत्त्वात्, तावता च तस्य चरितार्थत्वेऽतत्पराणा मगतिकानां ब्रह्मवाक्यानां परमार्थसत्यविषयाणां नाकस्माद्बाधो युक्तः । तदर्थस्य व्यवहारातीतत्वेन व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यानुपपत्तौ ब्रह्मवाक्यानां तात्त्विकप्रामाण्यस्याप्यनङ्गीकारे किञ्चिदपि प्रामाण्यं न स्यात्, प्रकारभेदेनोभयप्रामाण्योपपत्तौ च सर्वात्मना तदप्रामाण्यं न युक्तम् । तदुक्तं सकलवेदार्थज्ञेन ब्रह्मणापि—

"सत्यार्थो हि द्विधा प्रोक्तो मया हे स्वर्गवासिनः ।
एकः स्वभावतः साक्षात् परमार्थः सदैव तु ॥

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१. बोधनमनुपपन्नं इति पा. २. स्फुरन्त्येते इत्यस्यायं इति पा.

स शिवः सत्यचैन्यः सुखानन्त्य[1] स्वलक्षणः ।

अपरः कल्पितः साक्षाद्ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तमायया ॥

व्यावहारिकसत्यार्थं साक्षात् सत्यार्थचिद्घनम् ।

उभयं वक्ति वेदस्तु मार्गा नैवं वदन्ति हि" ॥

अतोऽद्वितीयब्रह्मण एव परमार्थसत्यत्वेऽपि व्यावहारिकसत्यार्थत्वेनार्थवत्त्वान्न कर्मकाण्डाद्यप्रामाण्यमिति ॥१८ ॥

नन्वेवमपि जीवस्य भोक्तुस्तद्भोग्यजातस्य च ब्रह्ममात्रत्वेऽनुभूयमानभोक्तृभोग्य-विभागो न स्यात्, सर्वस्य ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तत्वाविशेषात्, इत्याशङ्क्य मायावशादेव विभागोऽयमुपपद्यत इत्याह—

जडाजडविभागोऽयमजडे मयि कल्पितः ।

भित्तिभागे समे चित्रचराचरविभागवत् ॥१९ ॥

जडेति । जडाजडविभागो, जडमिदं भोग्यमजडोऽयं भोक्तेति विभागः । अयं प्रतीयमानोऽजडेऽलुप्तचैतन्यस्वभावे मयि प्रत्यगभिन्ने ब्रह्मणि कल्पितः । माययारोपित इत्यर्थः । स्वप्रकाशेऽप्येकस्मिन् ब्रह्मण्युपाधिप्राधान्याद् भोग्यजडकल्पना, उपाधेयप्राधान्यादजड-भोक्तृकल्पनाप्युपपद्यते । तदुक्तं वार्तिककारैः—

"तमःप्रधानक्षेत्राणां चित्प्रधानश्चिदात्मनाम् ।

परः कारणतामेति भावनाज्ञानकर्मभिः" ॥इति ।

अजडे ब्रह्मणि सदृशविसदृशोभयकल्पने दृष्टान्तमाह— भित्तिरित्यादिना । भित्ति-भागे कुड्यप्रदेशे समे निर्विकारे, अचल इत्यर्थः । चराचरविभागवत् चरस्य गजादेरच-रस्य[2] पर्वतादेश्च विभागो यथा, तथेत्यर्थः ॥१९ ॥

नन्वेवमात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वं न सम्भवति, तस्य संसारसाक्षितारूपविकल्पयुक्तत्वाद् ब्रह्मणश्च "अस्थूलमनणु", "नेति नेति" इत्यादिश्रुत्या निर्विकल्पकतया सिद्धेरित्याश-ङ्क्याह—

चेत्योपरागरूपा मे साक्षितापि न तात्त्विकी ।

उपलक्षणमेवेयं निस्तरङ्गचिदम्बुधेः ॥२० ॥

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१. –नन्दः इति पा.   २. –स्य जंगमादेरचरस्य इति पा.

चेत्येति। चेत्योपरागरूपा, चेत्यं कर्तृत्वादिप्रपञ्चः, तेनोपरागः सम्बन्धः, तद्रूपसाक्षितापि साक्षित्वमपि मे मम प्रत्यगात्मनो न तात्त्विकी, न परमार्थभूता, चेत्यस्यापरमार्थत्वेन तत्सम्बन्धिसाक्षिताया अपि परमार्थस्वरूपत्वायोगात्, किं त्वियं साक्षिता निस्तरङ्गचिदम्बुधेर्निस्तरङ्गः परमार्थतो निरस्तस्तरङ्गः कर्तृत्वादिप्रपञ्चरूपो यस्याः सा, चिदेवाम्बुधिः समुद्रो निस्तरङ्गचिदम्बुधिः, तस्य मे मम प्रत्यगात्मन उपलक्षणमेव, तटस्था सती ज्ञापिकैव, जगत्कारणत्वमिव ब्रह्मणः, तथा चात्मनो वस्तुतो निर्विकल्पत्वात्र ब्रह्मत्वानुपपत्तिरिति भावः ॥२० ॥

एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेण ब्रह्मणि जगत आत्मनि चाहङ्कारादेः कल्पितत्वेन वस्तुतोऽभावात् पदद्वयलक्ष्ये ब्रह्मणि न कश्चिदपि विकार इत्याह—

अमृताब्धेर्न मे जीर्णिर्मृषा डिण्डीरजन्मभिः ।

स्फटिकाद्रेर्मे रागः स्वाप्नसंध्याभ्रविभ्रमैः ॥२१ ॥

अमृतेति। अमृतो मोक्षरूपः स्वयंप्रकाशाद्वयानन्द एवाब्धिः, तस्य तत्पदलक्ष्यस्येत्यर्थः । मे मम प्रत्यगभिन्नब्रह्मणो मृषाडिण्डीरजन्मभिर्मृषारूपा मिथ्यारूपा वियदादय एव डिण्डीराः फेनास्तेषां यानि जन्मानि तैर्जन्मभिः, जन्मपदं नाशस्याप्युपलक्षणम्, न जीर्णिर्न हानिर्वृद्धिर्वा, जीर्णिपदं वृद्धेरप्युपलक्षणम्, मिथ्यावस्तुनोऽधिष्ठानादूषकत्वादित्यर्थः । ब्रह्मणि मायया वियदाद्युत्पत्त्या तदधिष्ठानब्रह्मणो न हानिर्न वृद्धिः, इत्येतद्भारतीतीर्थैरपि कूटस्थदीपे भणितम्—

"माया मेघो जगन्नीरं वर्षत्वेष यथा तथा ।

चिदाकाशस्य नो हानिर्न वा लाभ इति स्थितिः" ॥इति ।

त्वंपदलक्ष्यमपि शुद्धमित्याह— स्फटिकाद्रेरित्यादिना । स्फटिकाद्रेः स्फटिकाद्रिवत् स्वच्छस्य मे मम प्रत्यगात्मनस्त्वंपदलक्ष्यस्य, स्वाप्नसन्ध्याभ्रविभ्रमैः, स्वाप्नोऽविद्याकल्पितोऽहङ्कारादिः, स एव सन्ध्याभ्रं सन्ध्याकालिकमेघः स्वसन्निहिते स्वच्छे स्वधर्मासञ्जकत्वसाम्यात्, तत्कृतैर्विभ्रमैः कर्तृत्वादिभ्रान्तिभिः, मेघविषये विभ्रमा अनवस्थानानि संसाराः, तै रागः सम्बन्धो मेघविषय आरुण्यम्, स्फटिकपर्वतस्यारुण्यवत्, आत्मनश्चिद्रूपस्य परमार्थतः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरागद्वेषादिसम्बन्धो नास्तीत्यर्थः । अहङ्कारादिधर्मैरात्मनोऽसम्बन्धोऽपि श्रीभारतीतीर्थैरेवाभाणि चित्रदीपे—

"अहङ्कारगतेच्छाद्यैर्देहव्याध्यादिभिस्तथा ।

वृक्षादिजन्मनाशैर्वा चिद्रूपात्मनि किं भवेत्" ॥इति ।

अतः पदद्वयलक्ष्यमपि चैतन्यमतिशुद्धमिति भावः ॥२१ ॥

नन्वेवमपि पदद्वयलक्ष्ये ब्रह्मण्यस्त्येव विकारः, तस्य परमार्थतः सत्त्वाश्रयत्वस्य वक्तव्यत्वात्, अन्यथा शशविषाणवदसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात्, इत्याशङ्क्याह—

स्वरूपमेव मे सत्त्वं न तु धर्मो नभस्त्ववत्।

मदन्यस्य सतोऽभावान्न हि सा जातिरिष्यते ॥२२॥

स्वरूपमिति। मे मम पदद्वयलक्ष्यस्य सत्त्वं स्वरूपमेव, न तु मदाश्रितो धर्मः। यथा सत्त्वस्य सत्त्वान्तराश्रयत्वाभावान्नासत्त्वं तद्वदित्यर्थः।

ननु घटे घटत्ववत् सद्रूप आत्मन्यपि धर्मरूपं सत्त्वं किं न स्यादित्याशङ्क्य घटेष्वनेकेषु घटोऽयं घटोऽयमित्यनुगतव्यवहारसिद्धये घटत्वजातिरिव सद्व्यक्तिभेदाभावेनात्मनि सत्त्वरूपा जातिर्नाङ्गीकार्येत्याह— मदन्यस्येत्यादिना। मदन्यस्य पदद्वयलक्ष्यरूपात्मभिन्नस्य सतः सद्व्यक्त्यन्तरस्याभावात् सा सत्त्वरूपा जातिर्नेष्यते, एकव्यक्तौ जात्यनङ्गीकारे दृष्टान्तमाह— नभस्त्ववदिति। घटादिष्वनुगतव्यवहारार्थं घटत्ववज्जातिरङ्गीक्रियते। अत्र तु[१] वियदादेः सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वेन सदन्तरस्याभावान्नानुगतव्यवहारार्थं घटत्ववज्जातिरूपं सत्त्वमङ्गीक्रियते; किन्तु स्वरूपमेव नभस्त्ववत्।

ननु घटः सन् पटः सन् कुड्यं सदित्यादिप्रतीत्यनुरोधेन घटपटाद्युपाधिभिन्नेषु सत्स्वनुगतव्यवहाराय सत्त्वं जातिरङ्गीक्रियताम्, इति चेत्, न, उपहितेषु सर्वेष्वनुगतब्रह्मरूपसन्मात्रेणैव घटाद्युपाधि [illegible]; तस्मान्न सत्त्वं जातिः। अत एव नोपाधिरपि, अनुगतव्यवहारायैव तस्यापि कल्पितत्वात्, सत्त्वस्य सन्मात्रब्रह्मरूपत्वं वसिष्ठेनाप्युक्तम्—

"विशेषं संपरित्यज्य सन्मात्रं यदलेपकम्।

एकरूपं महारूपं सत्तायास्तत् परं विदुः" ॥इति।

तथा च सत्त्वस्य स्वरूपत्वेन धर्मत्वाभावादत्यन्तं शुद्धमेव पदद्वयलक्ष्यमिति भावः ॥२२॥

नन्वेवमप्यात्मनो ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्, अन्यथा घटादिवदनात्मत्वाप्रसङ्गात्। ज्ञानाश्रयस्यैवात्मत्वादहं जानामीत्यात्मनो ज्ञानाश्रयत्वप्रतीतेश्च, तथा च न "साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च" इत्यादिश्रुत्या निर्गुणब्रह्मत्वमात्मन इत्यत आह—

स्वरूपमेव मे ज्ञानं न गुणः स गुणो यदि।

अनात्मत्वमसत्त्वं वा ज्ञेयाज्ञेयत्वयोः पतेत् ॥२३॥

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१. न तु इति पा.

स्वरूपमेवेति। मे मम ज्ञानं चैतन्यं स्वरूपमेव, न तु मदाश्रितो गुणः, कुत इत्यत आह, स गुणो यदीत्यादिना, स चैतन्यं, विधेयापेक्षया पुंलिङ्गनिर्देशः, चैतन्यं गुण इति वदन् वादी प्रष्टव्यः, किं तेन चैतन्येनात्मा विषयीक्रियते न वा, उभयथापि दूषणमाह। अनात्मत्वमिति, ज्ञेयाज्ञेयत्वयोरात्मनो वेद्यत्वेऽनात्मत्वम्, घटादिवदवेद्यत्वे चासत्त्वं वा शशविषाणवदापतेत्, भवेदित्यर्थः। यद्यात्मनः स्वसमवेतज्ञानाविषयत्वमुच्यते, तदाज्ञायमानत्वेनात्मनोऽसत्त्वं स्यात्, न हि प्रमाणतो ज्ञायमानं शशविषाणमस्तीति केनचित् प्रतिपद्यते, यद्येतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया तस्य ज्ञायमानत्वमुच्येत, तदा घटादिवदनात्मत्वमात्मनः स्यात्, ज्ञानविषयस्यानात्मत्वनियमात्।

नन्वात्माश्रितज्ञानेनात्माश्रयत्वेन भासते, न विषयत्वेन, येन घटादिवदनात्मत्वं स्यादिति चेत्, न, ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तस्य ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानविषयत्वनियमेनात्मनोऽपि ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशस्य विषयताया आवश्यकत्वेनानात्मत्वदोषतादवस्थ्यात्।

न च ज्ञानाश्रयत्वमात्मत्वे प्रयोजकम्, लाघवात्, ज्ञानत्वस्यैव तत्प्रयोजकत्वात्। अहं जानामीति प्रतीतेश्चाहङ्काराश्रयवृत्तिविषयत्वात्।

न च ज्ञानं नष्टं ज्ञानमुत्पन्नमिति प्रतीत्या तस्य जन्मादिमत आत्मत्वमनुपपन्नमिति वाच्यम्, तस्यापि वृत्तिविषयत्वात्।

तस्मादात्मनो न ज्ञानं गुणः; किन्तु स्वरूपमेव, बादरायणोऽपि "ज्ञोऽत एव" इत्यात्मनो ज्ञानरूपत्वं सूत्रयाम्बभूव। सूत्रस्यार्थो विद्यारण्यगुरुभिरधिकरणरत्नमालायां दर्शितः—

"अचिद्रूपोऽथ चिद्रूपो जीवोऽचिद्रूप इष्यते।

चिदभावात् सुषुप्त्यादौ जाग्रच्चिन्मनसा कृता"॥

इति पूर्वपक्षे प्राप्तसिद्धान्तमाह—

"ब्रह्मत्वादेव चिद्रूपश्चित् सुषुप्तौ न लुप्यते।

द्वैता दृष्टिर्द्वैतलोपान्न हि द्रष्टुरिति श्रुतेः" ॥इति।

ननु ज्ञानरूप आत्मा स्वात्मानं जानाति न वा, जानाति चेद्युगपत् कर्मकर्तृत्वप्रसङ्गः। न चेज्जानाति, तस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्गः, इति चेत्, न, तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वेन ज्ञानान्तरमनपेक्ष्यैव भासमानत्वात्, नापि तस्य कर्मकर्तृत्वम्, स्वविषयत्वानङ्गीकारात्। तदुक्तं विद्यारण्यगुरुभिः पञ्चकोशविवेके—

"स्वयमेवानुभूतित्वाद्विद्यते नानुभाव्यते।

ज्ञातृज्ञानान्तराभावादज्ञेयो न त्वसत्तया" ॥इति।

यत् प्रसादाद्धि सर्वं जगद्भासते स कथं नास्ति, न प्रकाशते वा, आत्मनः सर्वावभासकत्वं स्वस्यान्यानपेक्षया भासमानत्वं चात्मयोगविंशे[१]ऽप्युक्तम्—

"अज्ञानतत्कार्यतदीयभेदानध्यक्षयन्ती निजसत्तयैव।

स्मर्तुं च विस्मर्तुमहो न शक्या सुप्त्यादिषु स्वप्रभयास्मि सा चित्" ॥इति।

तस्मादात्मा ज्ञानरूपो न ज्ञानगुणक इति स निर्गुणं ब्रह्म भवेदिति भावः ॥२३॥

एवमात्मन आनन्दोऽपि न गुणः; किन्तु स्वरूपमेवेति साधयति—

अहमेव सुखं नान्यदन्यच्चेन्नैव तत् सुखम्।

अमदर्थं न हि प्रेयो मदर्थं न स्वतः प्रियम् ॥२४॥

अहमिति। अहमात्मा सुखमेव सुखस्वरूप एव, न तु सुखगुणकः, यदि सुखमात्मनोऽन्यद्गुणः स्यात्, तत् सुखत्वेनाभिमतं नैव सुखं स्यात्, कुत इति चेत्, किं तदनात्मभूतसुखमनात्मशेषः, उत तच्छेषो वा?

नाद्य इत्याह— अमदर्थमिति। अमदर्थं, चेदित्यनुषङ्गः, आत्मशेषो न चेत् तर्हि न तत् प्रेयः, प्रीतिविषयो न भवेत्, आत्मशेषसर्पादौ प्रीतिविषयत्वादर्शनात्।

न द्वितीय इत्याह— मदर्थमिति। अत्रापि चेदित्यनुषज्ज्यते। मदर्थमात्मशेषश्चेत् स्वतः प्रियं न स्यात्, आत्मशेषस्य पुत्रभार्यादेः स्वतः प्रीतिविषयत्वादर्शनादित्यर्थः। सुखं हि सर्वेषां प्रियं भवति, तच्च स्वत एव प्रियम्, न परोपाधिना, अत आत्मैव भवितुमर्हति।

कथमिति चेत्, शृणु, जगति सर्वेषां पदार्थानां चतुर्धावस्थितिः। आत्मा प्रियोऽप्रिय उपेक्ष्यश्चेति, सुखं तावन्न व्याघ्रादिवदप्रियम्, तस्य सर्वैः प्रार्थ्यमानत्वात्, अत एव न लोष्टादिवदुपेक्ष्यम्, नापि प्रियमात्रम्, तच्छेषे पुत्रभार्यादावपि तद्दर्शनात्, अतः परिशेषादात्मैव।

नन्वात्मशेषत्वेन तस्य प्रीतिविषयत्वं किं न स्यात्, इति चेत्, तर्हि वक्तव्यम्, आत्मनि प्रीतिः किं निमित्तेति, येन सुखमपि तच्छेषतया प्रियं जायते, सुखसाधनत्वादिति चेत्, तर्हि सुखसाधनेनात्मनोपकार्यः कश्चिद्वक्तव्यः, स्रक्चन्दनादिसुखसाधनेनान्यस्यैवोपकार्यत्वदर्शनात्, आत्मनि च कर्मकर्तृविरोधात्। स चोपकार्योऽन्यो न दृश्यते, तस्मान्न सुखसाधनतयात्मा प्रियः; किन्तु सुखस्वरूपतया। तस्मान्नात्मशेषतया सुखस्यापि प्रियत्वम्; किन्त्वात्मतयैव[२]।

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१. योगे चिदंशे— इति पा. २. किन्तु सुखतयैव इति पा.

ननु सुखमुत्पन्नं नष्टमिति प्रतीयमानस्य कथमात्मत्वमिति चेत्, न, तस्य तद्व्यञ्जकवृत्तिविषयत्वात्, सर्वमेतदुक्तं ब्रह्मानन्दे—

"आत्मा शेष उपेक्ष्यं च द्वेष्यं चेति चतुर्ष्वपि।
आत्मा प्रेयान् प्रियः शेषो द्वेष्योपेक्ष्ये तदन्ययोः॥
इति व्यवस्थितो लोको याज्ञवल्क्यमतं च तत्।
सुखसाधनतोपाधेरन्नपानादयः प्रियाः॥
आत्मानुकूल्यादन्नादिसमश्चेदमुनात्र कः।
अनुकूलयितव्यः स्यान्नैकस्मिन् कर्मकर्तृता"॥ इत्यादि।

आत्मनः सुखरूपत्वं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिरप्युक्तम्—

"सर्वं यदर्थमिह वस्तु यदस्ति किञ्चित्
पारार्थ्यमुज्झति च यन्निजसत्तयैव।
तद्वर्णयन्ति हि सुखं सुखलक्षणज्ञा
स्तत् प्रत्यगात्मनि समं सुखितास्य तस्मात्"॥इति।

ब्रह्मगीतासु च—

"प्रत्यग्रूपः शिवः साक्षात् परमानन्दलक्षणः।
परप्रेमास्पदत्वेन प्रतीतत्वात् सुरर्षभाः"॥
"सर्वस्यैव तु कामाय न सर्वं भवति प्रियम्।
किन्त्वात्मनस्तु कामाय ततः प्रियतमः स्वयम्॥
अतो देवाः प्रियतमो ह्यात्मा न सुखलक्षणः"। इत्यादि।

तस्माद्युक्त्या, विद्वदनुभूत्या, बहुविदां वचनैश्च, आत्मा सुखरूप इत्यत्र न कश्चिद्विवाद इति भावः ॥२४॥

नन्वेवमपि ब्रह्मणः "एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्" इति श्रुत्युक्तमखण्डैकरसत्वं न सम्भवति, उक्तप्रकारेण तस्य सच्चिदानन्दरूपत्रयात्मकत्वात्। न च सच्चिदानन्दानां तेषां त्रयाणामप्यत्यन्ताभेद इति वाच्यम्, तथात्वे तद्वाचकानां सच्चिदानन्दशब्दानां त्रयाणामपि पर्यायतया सह प्रयोगानुपपत्तेः। न हि घटकुम्भकलशादिशब्दानामेकार्थवाचकानां सह प्रयोगोऽस्तीत्याशङ्क्य ब्रह्मणोऽखण्डैकरसत्वमुपपादयति—

न हि नानास्वरूपं स्यादेकं वस्तु कदाचन।

तस्मादखण्ड एवास्मि विजहज्जागतीं भिदाम् ॥२५॥

न हीत्यादिना। एकमद्वितीयं सच्चिदानन्दात्मकं वस्तु ब्रह्म कदाचन कदाचिद प्युपाधिकाले तदभावकालेऽपि नानास्वरूपं नानारसं न स्यात्, न भवेदित्यर्थः। तत्र हेत्व भिप्रायेण वस्त्विति विशेषणम्, यतो वस्तु परमार्थभूतम्, तत इत्यर्थः। वस्तुग्रहणं ज्ञानानन्दयोरप्युपलक्षणम्।

अयमर्थः — ब्रह्मणि सत्यज्ञानानन्दानां परस्परभिन्नत्वे सत्यस्य सत्यत्वं ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानत्वमानन्दस्यानन्दत्वं च न सिध्येत्, कथमिति चेत्, सत्यं यदि ज्ञानाद्भिन्नं स्यात्, जडस्य तस्य शुक्तिकारूप्यादेरिव सत्यत्वं न स्यात्। एवं यदि ज्ञानमपि सत्याद्भिन्नं स्यात्, अस त्यस्य तस्य ज्ञानस्य जडत्वनियमेन ज्ञानत्वं न स्यात्, ततः सत्यज्ञानयोः सत्यत्वज्ञानत्व सिद्धयेऽत्यन्तं परस्पराभेदोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः। तदुक्तं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिः—

"सत्येऽप्यस्ति ज्ञानता ज्ञानतायां सत्यत्वं च स्पष्टमस्त्येव तद्वत्।

सत्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे ज्ञानसत्योपपत्तेः" ॥इति।

एवं यदि ज्ञानादानन्दोऽपि भिन्नः स्यात्, ज्ञानभिन्नस्य तस्य घटादिवदनानन्दत्वमेव स्यात्, तथानन्दादपि यदि ज्ञानं भिन्नं स्यात्, आनन्दभिन्नस्य तस्य घटादिवज्जडत्वेन ज्ञानत्वमेव न स्यात्, ततो ज्ञानानन्दयोरपि ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वसिद्धयेऽत्यन्तमभेदोऽङ्गीकर्तव्यः। इदमपि तैरेवोक्तम्—

"आनन्दत्वे ज्ञानता ज्ञानतायामानन्दत्वं विद्यते निर्विशङ्कम्।

सत्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे ज्ञानसौख्योपपत्तेः" ॥इति।

एवं सत्यादानन्दोऽपि यदि भिन्नः स्यात्, असत्यस्य तस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादेरिवानन्दत्वं न स्यात्, एवं सत्यमपि यद्यानन्दाद्भिन्नं स्यात्, अनानन्दस्य तस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादेरिव सत्यत्वं न स्यात्, ततः सत्यानन्दयोरप्यत्यन्तमभेदो वक्तव्यः, इदमपि तैरेवोक्तम्—

"आनन्दत्वे सत्यता सत्यतायामानन्दत्वं निर्विवादं प्रसिद्धम्।

सत्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे सत्यसौख्योपपत्तेः" ॥इति।

नित्यमुक्तशुद्धत्वादिष्वप्येवमेवोह्यम्[१]।

न च तेषामत्यन्ताभेदे तद्वाचकसत्यादि[२]पदानां पर्यायता वाच्या, अर्थानां भेदस्या ङ्गीकारात्, सत्यपदं मुख्यामुख्यसत्यरूपब्रह्माकाशशबलरूपे सत्ये व्युत्पन्नम्। ज्ञानपदं च

१. –मेव बोध्यम् इति पा. २. सच्चिदानन्दादि इति पा.

चैतन्यान्तःकरणवृत्तिरूपमुख्यामुख्यज्ञानद्वयशबलरूपे ज्ञाने व्युत्पन्नम्, आनन्दपदं च प्रत्यग् बुद्धिवृत्तिरूपमुख्यामुख्यानन्दे व्युत्पन्नम्। एवं नित्यशुद्धादीन्यपि पदानि मुख्यामुख्यतत्त द्द्वयशबलरूपे तस्मिंस्तस्मिन् व्युत्पन्नानीति द्रष्टव्यम्। एतत् सर्वं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि भिरेवोक्तम्—

"आकाशादौ सत्यता तावदेका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे सत्यता काचिदन्या।
तत्सम्पर्कात् सत्यता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं सत्यशब्दस्तु तत्र॥
बुद्धेर्वृत्तौ ज्ञानता तावदेका प्रत्यग् बोधे ज्ञानता काचिदन्या।
तत्सम्पर्काज्ज्ञानता तत्र चान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं ज्ञानशब्दस्तु तत्र॥
बुद्धेर्वृत्तौ तावदानन्दतैका प्रत्यङ्मात्रे काचिदानन्दतान्या।
तत्सम्पर्कात् काचिदानन्दतान्या व्युत्पन्नोऽयं तत्र चानन्दशब्दः" ॥इत्यादिना।

ततो वाच्यार्थभेदस्याङ्गीकारान्न पदानां पर्यायतापीति भावः।

ननु कथं तर्हि वाच्यार्थभेदे सत्यादीनामत्यन्ताभेद उक्त इत्याशङ्क्य वाच्यार्थ भेदेऽपि तल्लक्ष्यार्थानामभेदादित्याह, तस्मादित्यादिना। यस्मात् सत्यादीनां परस्पराभेदेन सत्यादिरूपत्वम्, यस्माच्च न पर्यायता, तस्माज्जागतीं भिदां जगदाकाशाद्युपाधिः, तत्प्रयुक्तां भिदां भेदं विजहति, अतोऽहमखण्ड एवास्मि, एकरस एवास्मि, न तु नानारसः, सत्यादि पदैर्भागलक्षणया बोधितसत्याद्यात्मकाखण्डैकरसोऽस्मीत्यर्थः।

अत "एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्" इति श्रुत्युक्तमेकरसत्वमुपपन्नमिति भावः ॥२५॥

इदानीमुक्तप्रकारेण जीवस्य ब्रह्मत्वोपपादकैस्तर्कैरनुगृहीतं सत् तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं जीवब्रह्मणोरत्यन्ताभेदं भागत्यागलक्षणया बोधयति, इत्याह—

परोक्षतापरिच्छेदशाबल्यापोहनिर्मलम्।
तदसीति गिरा लक्ष्यमहमेकरसं महः ॥२६॥

परोक्षतेति। परोक्षतापरिच्छेदश्च तत्प्रयोजकं शाबल्यं च तानि तथोक्तानि, तेषाम पोहेन निर्मलं परोक्षतापरिच्छेदशाबल्यापोहनिर्मलम्[1], परोक्षता परोक्षत्वमीश्वरस्य, परिच्छेदः परिच्छिन्नत्वं जीवस्य, एतद्द्वयं च जीवेश्वरोभयगतविरुद्धधर्माणां सर्वेषामप्युपलक्षणम्। शाबल्यं जीवेश्वरोभयगतपरोक्षत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वादिप्रयोजकमायान्तःकरणरूपोपाधिनिमित्त समस्त[2]सम्बन्धः, तेषामपोहेन त्यागेन निर्मलं शुद्धम्, ऐक्याविरोधीत्यर्थः। तदसीति गिरा

१. –हेन निर्मलं तथोक्तम्, इति पा. २. धिद्वय- इति पा.

तत्त्वमस्यादिमहावाक्येन लक्ष्यं जहदजहल्लक्षणया बोध्यम्, लक्ष्यस्वरूपमेवाह— एकरस मिति। महः सत्यानन्दचैतन्यरूपमहं प्रत्यगात्मास्मीत्यर्थः। अत्राप्यनुग्राहकयुक्तिः पूर्ववद् द्रष्टव्या, यद्यात्मा ब्रह्मभिन्नः स्यादात्मनः सर्वान्तरत्वलक्षणमात्मत्वं न स्यात्, एवं ब्रह्मापि यद्यात्मभिन्नं स्यान्निरतिशयमहत्त्वलक्षणं ब्रह्मत्वं ब्रह्मणो न स्यात्। इदमपि तैरेवोक्तम्—

"अद्वैतेऽर्थे प्रत्यगर्थोऽस्ति तद्वत् प्रत्यक्तत्त्वे चाद्वयस्यापि भावः।

यद्यप्येवं नातिरेकावकाशः पूर्णे तत्त्वे तत्त्वमर्थोपपत्तेः"॥इति।

वाच्यार्थभेदादेवोभयोस्तत्त्वंपदयोरपर्यायतापि। इदमपि तैरेवोक्तम्—

"आदेयांशेनाणुमात्रोऽपि भेदो यद्यप्येवं भिन्नमादाय शब्दौ।

वर्तेते त्वय्यद्वयात्मप्रकाशे बाह्यं हातुं जामिता[1] नास्ति तस्मात्"॥इति।

वाक्यार्थश्च सकलवेदार्थाभिज्ञेन ब्रह्मणा ब्रह्मगीतायां स्फुटो दर्शितः —

"त्वमहंशब्दवाच्यार्थस्यैव देहादिवस्तुनः।

न तच्छब्दार्थतां वक्ति श्रुतिस्तत्त्वमसीति सा[2]॥

तदर्थैक्यविरुद्धांशं त्यक्त्वा वाच्यगतं श्रुतिः।

अविरुद्धं चिदाकारं लक्षयित्वा ब्रवीति हि॥

तदर्थे च त्वमर्थैक्यं विरुद्धांशं विनैव च।

कारणत्वादि वाच्यस्थं रक्षयित्वा तु केवलम्॥

चिदाकारं पुनस्तस्य त्वमर्थैक्यं ब्रवीति च।

तत्त्वंशब्दार्थभूतस्य चिन्मात्रस्य परात्मनः॥

एकत्वं यत् स्वतः सिद्धं स हि वाक्यार्थ आस्तिकाः"॥इति।

तस्माच्छ्रुत्या युक्त्या बहुज्ञानां वचनाच्च[3] जीवस्य सच्चिदानन्दनित्यशुद्धबुद्ध मुक्तस्वरूपता सिद्धेति भावः॥२६॥

इदानीमुक्तस्वरूपं ब्रह्मात्मत्वेन साक्षात्कुर्वतः पुरुषस्य स्वप्रकाशापरिमितानन्दब्रह्मा त्मतावस्थानलक्षणा विदेहमुक्तिः प्रारब्धकर्मक्षयपर्यन्तं देहेन्द्रियादिप्रतिभाससहिता तादृग् ब्रह्मात्मनावस्थानलक्षणा जीवन्मुक्तिश्च फलमित्यभिप्रेत्य प्रकरणमुपसंहरति—

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१. -ह्यादेवं हेतुता—इति पा. २. या इति पा. ३. -स्या बहुवचनाच्च इति पा.

उपशान्तजगज्जीवशिष्याचार्येश्वरभ्रमम् ।

स्वतः सिद्धमनाद्यन्तं परिपूर्णमहं महः ॥२७॥

उपशान्तेति। उपशान्तो जीवन्मुक्त्यवस्थायां बाधितो विदेहमुक्त्यवस्थायां सर्वात्मना निवृत्तो जगज्जीवशिष्याचार्येश्वरलक्षणो भ्रमो यस्मिंस्तत्, तादृशम् । मुक्तिद्वयस्य ज्ञानफलत्वं सर्वज्ञात्ममुनिभिरप्युक्तम्—

"जीवन्मुक्तिस्तावदस्ति प्रतीतेर्द्वैतच्छाया तत्र चास्ति प्रतीतेः ।

द्वैतच्छायारक्षणायास्ति लेशस्तस्मिन्नर्थे स्वानुभूतिः प्रमाणम् ॥

तस्माज्जीवन्मुक्तिरूपेण विद्वानारब्धानां कर्मणां भोगसिद्ध्यै ।

स्थित्वा भोगं ध्वान्तगन्धं प्रसूतं भुक्त्वात्यन्तं याति कैवल्यमन्ते" ॥इति ।

स्वतः सिद्धं स्वप्रकाशम्, अनाद्यन्तम्, आद्यन्तरहितम्, परिपूर्णं सर्वात्मकम्, त्रिविधपरिच्छेदशून्यमित्यर्थः, महस्तेजोऽहमस्मीत्यर्थः ॥२७॥

इदानीमुपनिषदर्थसारसङ्ग्रहात्मके स्वरचिते प्रकरणे विदुषां प्रवृत्तिं प्रार्थयते—

[१]*लक्ष्मीधरकवेः सूक्तिशरदम्भोजसम्भृतः ।*

अद्वैतमकरन्दोऽयं विद्वद्भृङ्गैर्निपीयताम् ॥२८॥

लक्ष्मीधर इति ग्रन्थकर्तुर्नाम, स चासौ कविः सर्वज्ञः क्रान्तदर्शी, तस्य सूक्तय एव शरदम्भोजानि, तानि, तैः[२] सम्भृतः सम्पन्नोऽयं सर्वैरनुभूयमानोऽद्वैतमकरन्दोऽद्वैतं ब्रह्मैव मकरन्दो रसः ।

"एतमेव रसं साक्षाल्लब्ध्वा देही सनातनम् ।

सुखी भवति सर्वत्र नाऽन्यथा सुरपुंगवाः" ॥

इति ब्रह्मगीतावचनात्, विद्वद्भृङ्गैर्विद्वांस एव भृङ्गा ब्रह्मरसज्ञास्तैर्निपीयतां नितरामज्ञान[३] निवृत्तिपर्यन्तं पुनः पुनः सेव्यताम् ।

"विचार्याप्यपरोक्षेण ब्रह्मात्मानं न वेत्ति चेत् ।

अपरोक्षावसानत्वाद्भूयो भूयो विचारयेत्" ॥इति श्रीभारतीतीर्थवचनात् ।

यद्यप्यत्र प्रतिश्लोकं बहु वक्तव्यमस्ति, तथापि मन्दबुद्धीनामलसानां व्युत्पादनार्थं प्रवृत्तेन मया ग्रन्थकाठिन्यगौरवभयादुपरतमिति ॥२८॥

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१. वंशीधर इति क्वाचित्कः पाठः, २. तेषु इति पा. ३. –रामात्माज्ञान इति पा.

अद्वैतमकरन्दस्य रसाभिव्यञ्जिका कृता ।

स्वयंप्रकाशयतिना पुरुषोत्तमशासनात् ॥१ ॥

ब्रह्मानन्दरसास्वादमिच्छद्भिर्विबुधोत्तमैः ।

रसाभिव्यञ्जिका ह्येषा परिशील्या सदादरात्[१] *॥२ ॥*

तापत्रयार्कसन्तप्ता मोक्षकामा मुदा सह ।

रसाभिव्यञ्जिकागङ्गामग्ना भवत सत्तमाः[२] *॥३ ॥*

व्याख्या प्रणीतच्छलमत्र बुद्धेर्ममापराधं विबुधाः क्षमन्ताम् ।

अम्बार्धदेहो भगवानतः स्याद्बालापराधात् पितृवत् प्रसन्नः ॥४ ॥

श्रीकैवल्यानन्दयोगीन्द्रपादपद्मद्वन्द्वे निःस्रवन्मोक्षसारे ।

शुद्धैर्हंसैः सेविते सुप्रसन्ने मच्चेतोऽर्थी भृङ्गलीलां विधत्ताम् ॥५ ॥

चिदम्भोधिसम्मग्नचित्तं गुणानां सतामालयं शुद्धसत्त्वप्रधानम् ।

नृणां बोधयन्तं परब्रह्म तत्त्वं शिवानन्दयोगीन्द्रमीडे सदाहम् ॥६ ॥

सर्वज्ञचूडामणिमीश्वराणामीशानमिन्दीवरकोमलाङ्गम् ।

कारुण्यलावण्यसुधासमुद्रं श्रीजानकीजानिमहं भजामि ॥७ ॥

मन्दस्मितानन्दितभक्तजालं सौन्दर्यसन्तर्पितवामभागम् ।

स्वानन्दसन्तृप्तममन्दहासं साम्बं भजे चन्द्रकलावतंसम् ॥८ ॥

॥ इति श्रीम[३]त्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यश्रीकैवल्यानन्दयोगीन्द्रपादकमल-भृङ्गायमाणस्वयंप्रकाशाख्ययतिविरचिता रसाभिव्यञ्जिकाख्याद्वैतमकरन्दव्याख्या समाप्ता ॥

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२. दा बुधैः इति पा.।

३. इदं श्लोकत्रयं सच्चिदानन्दानाम् ।

४. मिति ॥२८॥ ब्रह्मानन्दरसास्वादमिच्छद्भिर्विबुधोत्तमैः। रसाभिव्यञ्जिका ह्येषा परिशील्या सदादरात्॥ इति श्री- इति पा.।

उपसंहारः

[१] *तन्महः किमपि नौमि मुनीनां मानसे स्फुरति यद् बहुयत्नैः।*
नन्दगोपगृहिणीसुतभावाद्धूलिधूसरितभं घननीलम् ॥१॥

अथेदमद्वैतमकरन्दाख्यं प्रकरणं सव्याख्यं प्रायः किञ्चिदधिकपञ्चशतीमितश्लोकसंख्याकं भवति। मूलं त्वष्टाविंशतिसंख्याकानुष्टुप्श्लोकपरिमितमेव लक्ष्मीधरकवीन्द्रकृतम्, वंशीधर इति तस्यैव नामान्तरम्, तथा पाठस्य क्वचिदुपलभ्यमानत्वात्। जनकाचार्यकृत कल्पनाभेदेन लालनप्रतिष्ठार्थत्वभेदेनाश्रमभेदेन नामसंकरभयप्रयुक्तकल्पनया चैकस्यापि नामद्वयसम्भवाच्च।

इदं च प्रकरणं स्वल्पमपि महाप्रामाणिकम्, परिमलादिबहुवेदान्तसन्दर्भव्याख्या विधात्रा स्वयंप्रकाशाख्ययतिनास्य व्याख्याकरणात्, स्वल्पत्वेऽपि परिनिष्ठितमतिकलेख तया तत्कारिकार्थस्य बह्वर्थबोधकत्वाच्च।

एष स्वयंप्रकाशाख्ययतिरुपदेष्टृत्वविद्यादातृत्वादिभेदेन कैवल्यानन्दशुद्धानन्द सच्चिदानन्दशिवानन्दविद्यारण्ययतीन्द्रान् गुरून् मन्यते, तथा स्वकृतव्याख्यायामस्यामभि हितत्वात्, पुरुषोत्तमनामधेयाज्ञापरवशोऽकृतेमां च व्याख्यामिति।

अथामुमेव प्रोक्तचरनामधेयं लक्ष्मीधरं काशिकराजकीयपाठालयस्य वेदान्तशास्त्रा ध्यापकस्वर्वासिमहानुभावश्रीमदुमारावशर्मपण्डितः सिद्धान्तकौमुदीमनोरमाशब्दकौस्तु भादिप्रसिद्धव्याकरणग्रन्थनिर्मातुः कालनिर्णयादिधर्मशास्त्रग्रन्थकर्तुः प्रायश्चतुर्विंशतिस्मृति व्याख्यातुर्भट्टोजिदीक्षितस्य पितरं वक्ति स्म।

श्रुतं च मया काव्यसाहित्याध्यापकपण्डितशीतलप्रसादशर्मणान्यैश्च विद्वद्भिस्तन्म हानुभावसविधे वेदान्तशास्त्राध्ययनसमये तन्मुखारविन्दादेवैतत्।

तथाप्यत्र कस्यापि प्रमाणस्यानुपलभ्यमानत्वादननुमतत्वम्, तदुक्तं "विद्यारण्य गुरुभिः" इति वाक्यस्य स्वयंप्रकाशकृतव्याख्यायामस्यां दर्शनात् स्वयंप्रकाशस्य पञ्चदशी कारविद्यारण्यसमयवर्तिताया मूलकारस्य लक्ष्मीधरस्य विद्यारण्यपूर्ववर्तितायास्तत्समकालिकताया वावसायाद् भट्टोजिदीक्षितवर्तमानकालाद् बुक्वभूपालकालिकविद्यारण्यसमयस्य

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१. पं. ८, ८५ (जून २, १८७३) २१-२२.

दूरान्तरत्वेन लक्ष्मीधरसमयस्य महद्दूरमन्तरं सम्भावनीयमिति लक्ष्मीधरभट्टोजिदीक्षितयो रसमानकालिकत्वेन जन्यजनकभावानुपपत्तेः, भट्टोजिवंश्यानां भट्टदीक्षितोपनाम्नोरन्यतर स्योपाधेर्नामान्ते कौण्डभट्ट इति भट्टोजिदीक्षित इति यथा तथा लक्ष्मीधरनामान्ते प्रतिपादितचरोपाध्योरन्यतरस्यानुपलभ्यमानत्वाच्च।

भट्टोजिदीक्षितेन यद्यपि स्वग्रन्थे लक्ष्मीधरसूनोरिति स्वकण्ठरवत एवाभाणि, तथापि स एवायं लक्ष्मीधर इति दाक्षिणात्यैर्नाङ्गीक्रियते, बहुभिरन्यैर्विद्वद्भिरुरीक्रियते च।

तर्हि विद्यारण्यस्य गुरुत्वप्रतिपादनं स्वयंप्रकाशेन निरूप्यमाणं कथमुपपद्यत इति चेत्, आदरार्थं तत् स्यात्र तात्कालिकताबोधनार्थं परमगुरुत्वेन वेति कैश्चिदुच्यत इति।

अथामुष्य वादद्वयस्य साम्प्रतं विद्यमानत्वेऽपि सनिर्णयोऽहं त्वतो विचाराद्वि रमामि।

ग्रन्थश्चायं परमेश्वरप्रसादाद् वेदान्तविद्यावतां मुदमातनुतादित्यलं बहुलेखने- नेति शिवम्।



प्रथमं परिशिष्टम्

श्लोकार्धानुक्रमणिका

■

द्वितीयं परिशिष्टम्

व्याख्योद्धृतवचनानुक्रमणिका


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श्रीलक्ष्मीधरकवि विरचित

अद्वैतमकरन्दः

English translation



Advaitamakaranda

(A Summary of the Vedānta System)

of

LAKṢMĪDHARA

with the commentary of

Svayaṁprakāśa

English Translation

The Commentator's proem[1]

(i) According to revelation, argumentation, and the testimony of consciousness, I am the eternal absolute spirit, unintermitted beatitude, made of intelligence, void of fear, without duality.

(ii) I adore Śiva who wears the lunar digit, whose side is clasped by Ambā; the ocean of the waters of tenderness, whose form is sweet with beauty.

(iii) The sun-like pollen of the lotus-feet of Kaivalyānanda, prince of mystics, shines in the sky of my heart, dispelling the gloom of illusion.

(iv) I resort to the twin lotus-feet of Suddhānanda, from which springs the juice of extinction which his disciples like swarms of bees delight in tasting.

(v) Certain princes of mystics, existence, intelligence, beatitude, prevail in the world, through a measure of whose kindness, I have corssed the ocean of transmigratory being.

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1. Pan. 8, 89 (Oct. 1, 1873) 127-130. *Advaitamakaranda* can hardly be translated. The 'Flowery Sweets of the Undifferenced', or the 'Nectar of the Absolute', would appear absurd in English.

For the original text of this very simple exposition of Indian acosmism, the reader is referred to the edition of Pandit Becana-Rāma Śarmā, published in the '*Paṇḍit*' of June 2, pp. 9 sqq. (= This edition, *Supra*, pp. 1-30.)

The Author's proem

I

A certain great thinker, Lakṣmīdhara by name observed certain excellent persons de sirous of emancipation in consequence of the discriminative knowledge, dispassion, and self-subjugation generated by the purification of their intellect by their unremitted observance of constant and occasional duties, who for desire to know the soul had renounced the customs of society and of the Veda, and who, though they had duly heard the principles of the Vedānta by resorting to the feet of good instructors, yet were dissatisfied, because recognising an obstruction they did not see the possibility of emancipation. His compassion excited, he begins to compose a sectional treatise entitled the *Nectar of Monism*, with the purpose of enforcing by arguments clearly, as if he were contemplating a *Vilva*[1]-fruit held in the hand, that the supreme spirit set forth in the Vedānta, the spirit which is existent, intelligence, beatitude, omniscient, the material cause of all things, eternal, omnipresent, without duality, the witness of the body, sense organs, vital airs, common sensory, understanding, sense of personality, is naught else than the self-conscious soul. In order to complete the work in hand without hindrance, while himself practising the auspicious initiative which consists in the citation of his chosen tutelary divinity, he composes one in the text for the edification of his disciples, as follows: —

Text

Glory to the infinite beatitude Kṛṣṇa, whose embodiment is auspicious to the worlds, who with the rays of his glance evaporates the ocean of illusion in his worshippers. (1)

Commentary

Glory to him by whom the ocean of illusion or false persuasion in his worshippers is evaporated or dried up, with the

1. More correctly : Bilva.

ray or splendour of his glance or look of kindness thrown obliquely on those devoted to him. Illusion is aptly compared to an ocean, as being impassable to those who have not the grace of the Lord the great teacher, as having successive illusions for its billows, and as being infested by passions and the like huge leviathans. Glory be to the infinite beatitude Kṛṣṇa; infinite, as free from limitation by time, space and things; and beatitude, as having bliss for his essence, to the infinite beatitude Kṛṣṇa; to him who is at once infinite beatitude and Kṛṣṇa, to the son of Vāsudeva. Glory be to him whose embodiment is auspicious to the worlds, to him whose body causes increase of joy to the worlds, to him whose body causes increase of joy to the three spheres. By the phrase *Whose embodiment is auspicious to the worlds* it is declared that he is able to cast out the hindrances which militate against the highest end of man in this life and the next, for such is the character of the auspicious.

II

The author, after having by an auspicious proem thus performed, and consisting of a doxology to his tutelary divinity, destroyed all obstacles, proceeds to enforce the truth that the self-conscious spirit is the absolute, as is indicated in *That art thou* and other significant texts.

Text

I am, I appear at all times, I am not ever unbeloved: hence it is evinced that I am the absolute spirit which is existent, intelligence, and bliss. (2)

Commentary

I, the witness of the sense of personality and so forth, am, that is, am existent; inasmuch as I bestow a kind of being upon the sense of personality and other such unreal modifications illusorily attributed to soul. I appear at all times, that is I appear in the three

states of being. In waking I am manifested, or shine forth, as the witness of the body, the sensitive and active organs and so forth; in sleep, as the witness of the world of ideas in the internal organ; in dreamless slumber, as the witness of illusion. Not ever, not even at any time, not even in the time of suffering, am I unloved, am I undesired; but am always loved, and only loved. For as regards pain we have no aversion from the pain of an enemy, only because enmity is caused by love of self. As an object of love in its highest intensity, I am made of bliss. As not undergoing sublation in trinal time I am made up of being. As illuminating objects, I am intelligence. I am therefore the absolute spirit characterised by being, thought, and joy, composed of the existent, of intelligence, and beatitude. There is here implied the inference: The self-presented self is nought else than absolute spirit, because it consists of the existent, intelligence, and beatitude, like the absolute spirit. The middle term of this inference cannot be said to want confirmation, inasmuch as it is established by the fact that I am, etc.

If any one object that this inference is contradicted by the presentative datum that I am not God; we reply, that the fact that the soul is absolute spirit cannot in the first place be contradicted by external perception, for the soul being void of colour and other sensible qualities, external perception cannot operate about it; nor, in the second place, can it be contradicted by internal perception, for the internal sensory cannot operate about the soul or self which is the witness of the internal sensory.

Again, if any one urge that the argument that individual soul and the divine spirit are different, as supporting the diverse attributes of parviscience and omniscience, as fire and frost are different, and similar inferences are opposed to the inference above; we reply that the rule that differently determined things are different would apply be excessive extensiveness to an image and its reflection, and to the ether which (though acknowledged to be one) is the of sounds loud and soft.

Again, if any one object to us that our inference is contradicted by the such texts as 'Two birds', etc. This we deny, for such cannot be the purport of the text, such a sense being sublated by 'That art thou', and other texts.

The thought, therefore, that I am not God is an illusion caused by the body and the like accompaniments (of the soul); and does not regard the nature of the individual soul. It has accordingly been said:

> "When thou and I are considered, to one who looks upon my outside frame I am more insignificant than a gnat; but; lord of the universe, thy fulness of being, thought, and joy, and mine, are the same."

I, therefore, am absolute spirit only.

III

The author, starts a doubt: The absolute spirit according to such texts as 'All-knowing, all-wise', is understood to be omniscient; and according to such texts as or from which, is understood to be the material cause of the whole universe: whereas the individual spirit does not entirely know its own organism, and cannot of itself do anything; how then can the individual spirit be naught else than absolute spirit, omniscient, and the material cause of all things. He proceeds to show how both these attributes, omniscience and universal causality, may belong to the individuated soul.

Text

In me, in the sky of intelligence, arise the world's fairy castles 1 : how then am I not absolute spirit, all-knowing, cause of all? (3)

Commentary

In the sky of intelligence, in the heavens of consciousness, in me, in the self-presented self, arises the world's fairy castle, the

1. Literally cities of the *Gandharvas*.

universe itself a castle in the air. A fairy castle, or city of the Gandharvas is a city made to appear in the clouds by the illusions projected by a magician, in the enveloping state of illusion. The meaning is as follows. Of an unreal object the spectator alone is the material cause; as the material cause of the world of a dreamer is the dreamer who witness it, so the whole waking world being unreal, as being seen, that which sees it, the self-presented self, is to be declared its material cause. Therefore, it has been said:

> "As this world of dreams in me is projected by illusion, so the waking world in me is projected by illusion."

It results that omniscience, consistng in the vision of the universe, and universal causality, consisting in being the substance underlying that universe, pertain to the self-presented self.

You may say: How is the self-presented self the seer of mount Meru and other objects separated by a long distance and invisible to us? We reply: Hearken then to a mystery. Meru and other objects are recollected as determinants of that state of ignorance which is expressed in the form All this while I have not known Meru and the rest. Now this recollection, as being impossible unless we have had actual knowledge of Meru, supposes an actual knowledge of Meru and the rest. As the sense organs, etc., could not have operated in this case, we must affirm an actual knowledge of Meru and the other objects as illusorily superposed upon the consciousness of self-presented self. That which underlies the illusorily superposed is a substantial cause; and thus the self-presneted soul, though not actually cognising Meru and the like objects, is yet their witness, and their substantial cause. Conformably it has been said in the *Brahma-gītā*:

> "In a form cognised, or in a form not cognised by the witness, all appears; then it shines forth thence pervading it at all times."

The self-presented self then knows all and is the cause of all; for which reason in the aforesaid manner I am also the cause of all things; why should I not be absolute spirit which is that cause? I am.

IV

The author next starts the following difficulty : The absolute spirit is revealed in such texts of the Upaniṣads as, Everlasting, pervading, omnipresent, most subtile, to be eternal; while the soul or self, as subject to death and other conditions, is known to be non-eternal: they cannot therefore be identical. He then proposes three alternatives: (1) Do you conformably to the Buddhist view affirm that the soul of itself ceases to be; or (2) do you affirm its cessation as consequent upon conjunction with something else, as a water-jar is destroyed by the concussion of the potter's staff; or (3) do you affirm its cessation as resultant from the dstruction of its substratum, as the colour and other characters of a piece of cloth cease upon the cessation of the cloth? To first alternative he replies in the words *not of itself.*

Text

Destruction of me cannot be of itself, because of recognition; nor from anything else, because I am without parts; nor from destruction of substratum, because I do not inhere in anything. (4)

Commentary

There is no destruction of me, that is, of the self-conscious self. The reason of this is – because of recognition, that is, because soul undergoes recognition. Recognition is cognition at a subsequent time of the formerly experienced, through suggestion of such former experience, accompanied with assurance. For example in such thoughts as I who in childhood knew my parents now in old age know my great-grandchildren, I who while asleep

had a dream am now waking, the same self is recognised in childhood and old age, and in the sleeping and waking states. Now this recognition cannot be accounted for, if we suppose the soul to cease without any determinant. So again if the soul be said to perish of itself, we must assert that there is at each moment another self; and how could one recognise another as its own self. But the soul does recognise that it is itself, and therefore it cannot cease of itself.

The author redargues the second alternative, in the words *Nor from any thing else, because I am without parts.* The soul is not destroyed in consequence of conjunction with any foreign cause, because it is without parts, a simple entity; for the self, as consisting of intelligence, is simple. If you affirm that the soul, consisting of intelligence is composite, we ask: Are the portions of the soul intelligent or unintelligent? The former alternative cannot be true: for if the portions of the soul were severally intelligent, they would entertain contrary purposes, and the organism would be torn to pieces. The latter alternative must equally be rejected: for if the soul were composed of unintelligent portions, it would follow that the soul itself would be unintelligent. A piece of cloth, for instance, which is composed of unconscious threads, is not seen to be conscious. The self therefore is simple. The self if, simple, does not admit of conjunction with an exterior determinant, for this would have to connect itself with some portion. The soul therefore is not destructible from without.

The author redargues the third alternative in the words *Nor form destruction of substratum.* Destruction of the ego cannot result from destruction of its support or substratum. Why? Because it has no support or substratum. For the soul being neither quality, nor action, nor universal, nor any like thing inheres in nothing. Nor, as simple, does it require a support (or principle of unificaion) such as that of a water-pot (of which the whole is regarded a the support of the parts). Neither, therefore, from destruction of subst-

ratum, can there be any destruction of soul. The supposition that the self dies is an illusion occasioned by its concomitant the body. The author of the Vedānta aphorisms has accordingly said:

> "The movable and immovable do not apply thereto, the attribution of them thereto is tropical, because it is that which exists under these modes.[1]"

The sense of this aphorism is exhibited by the sacred teacher Vidyāraṇya or Mādhavācārya in the *Adhikaraṇa-ratna-mālā,* as follows: He first states the *primā facie* question:

> "The birth and death of the individual belong either to the body or to the soul, for there are the saying– There is born to me a son, and the ceremonial at birth."

He next lays down the established tenet :

> "Birth and death pertain primarily to the body, and by a metaphor only to the soul : and the rites at birth and the common saying do not pertain to the individuated soul, according to our system."

The soul being eternal, as being exempt from the three kinds of destruction, it is quite competent to hold that it is naught else than absolute spirit.

V

The author proceeds to treat in detail the second proposition, *viz.*, that the soul is not liable to destruction from any cause external to itself.

Text

The sky of my consciousness cannot be dried up, burnt, washed away, or cut asunder, by real, how much less by imaginary, wind, fire, water, or weapons. (5)

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1. *Brahma-Sūtra* 2.3..17.

Commentary

The sky of my consciousness, the heaven of my intelligence, cannot be dried up, as leaves and fruits are dried up, by wind. Nor can it be burnt, as a piece of cloth is consumed, by a fire. Nor is it washed away by water or rain like the crops in a field. Nor is it cut asunder, cleft in twain by weapon, as a sugarcane with a knief. For the soul, being like ether a simple principle, is insusceptible of conjunction with wind, etc. Sky or the ethereal element which is practically existent, as simple and therefore not admitting of contact, is not susceptible of being dried up or otherwise affected by wind and the other agents as above, though they are equally actual with ether; how much more must we affirm that exsiccation by means of air and the other agents which as imagined by illusion are unreal, cannot affect the soul which is really exempt from daulity and from contact with aught beyond itself? Conformably the Lord has said:

> 'Not to be cut is this, nor to be burnt, not to be wetted nor to be dried; eternal, omnipresent, stable, immovable, everlasting' (*Bhagavad-gītā* II. 24).

VI

Here the author anticipates the objection: The self-presented self is cognised as limited, from such assurances as that I am here; whereas absolute spirit, according to such texts as 'Eternal, all-pervading', is omnipresent; self therefore is not absolute spirit. He therefore proceeds to enforce the omnipresence of soul by argumentation.

Text

Cognition of the universe which is a reflection would never be competent, but for the proximity of a light: and I am that light, and consequently, omnipresent. (6)

Commentary

Cognition of the universe or manifestation of the world, which is a reflection, that is, unconscious, unsentient, would not be competent at any time, but for the proximity of a light, that is, without some connection with intelligence. I, the self-presented self, therefore, as illuminating the whole unsentient world, is ubiquitous; in other words, I am omnipresent. The solar and lunar orbs distant innumerable leagues, the pole-star and other stellar bodies yet more remote, derive their light from the self-presented self. This irradiation of those unsentient objects cannot arises from themselves but must be ascribed to the force of their connection with the intelligence of the soul which is self-illumined; as we see a water-jar and the like objects, which are of themselves void of light, illumined by force of conncetion with a self-illumined lamp or other luminary.

Now if the self-presented soul remained on this spot, how could it be connected with the pole-star and the rest? The self-presented self, then as illumining the pole-star and the rest, is omnipresent; and the supposition of its limitary nature is accounted for as a illusion arising from the accessories which bring the soul into manifestation. It is therefore said in the *Brahma-gītā*:

> "This world which consists of the unconscious cannot of itself shine forth; it is only by its connection with intelligence that it shines, and in no other wise.
>
> The limitary appearance of soul arises only from the limitation of its manifestants, not essentially; in truth, it consists of intelligence, and is all-pervading."

The individuated soul is, therefore, naught else than absolute spirit.

VII

Here some one may say: The identity of the individuated soul with absolute spirit is absurd, inasmuch as there is no evidence of

the existence of absolute spirit. For absolute spirit is defined to be a thing free from limitation by space, time and things; and this is an impossibility, for there is nothing to evince such absence of limitation by things, since time, ether etc., exist, ulterior to spirit. Nor, such a one would continue, should you assert that ether and the like, as illusorily superposed upon absolute spirit, are unreal, and therefore not ulterior thereto; for there is no proof that ether and the rest are thus illusorily superposed. Nor, he would furthermore say, should you allege that the text 'From spirit ether sprang', is proof of this: for from this text it appears only that ether and the rest are emanations from absolute spirit.

In anticipation of this objection, and to prove that there is naught ulterior to absolute spirit, the author proves that ether and the rest are illusorily superposed.

Text

For not without illumination is there existence, nor without consciousness is there any illumination of the unconscious; nor without illusory superpostiton is there any connection with consciousness : therefore I am exmpt from duality. (7)

Commentary

Without illumination or irradiation there is no existence of an object; as we do not see any existence to belong to the horns of a hare and the like chimerical things which are unillumined. What follows from this? The author replies: Nor without consciousness, that is, without connection with intelligence, is there any illumination of the unconscious or unintelligent; for were it possessed of illumination in itself, it would not be unconscious. What further follows? To this he replies, the connection of the unconscious with the conscious is not possible without illusory

surmisal, that is, in the absence of illusory superposition upon consciousness.

Our[1] author's meaning is as follows. A controversialist who asserts any other connection between the sentient and unsentient except the connection of illusory superposition should be asked what that connection may be: is it (1) that of conjunction, or (2) that of co-inherence, or (3) that of identity, (4) that of the relation of subject and object? It is not the first; for intelligence not being a basis of qualities and actions admits of no conjunction; for such a basis is that which supports qualities, while intelligence has no qualities.

Nor is it co-inherence; for the intelligent and unintelligent are neither qualities nor things possessing qualities. If any one argue that the relation of co-inherence may exist between the intelligent and unintelligent, as between threads and cloth, in virtue of the relation of material cause and effect; we deny this, for it being the relation of whole and parts that determines the co-inherence between threads and cloth, the relation of material cause and effect is not the source of that co-inherence: else it would follow that the shuttle and the web would co-inhere; and moreover the relation of part and whole does not obtain between vision and the visible.

Nor is it identity; for the intelligent and non-intelligent as reciprocal contradictories cannot be identical.

Nor is it the relation of subject and object, for this supposes an original relation, and this has been stated to be impossible; since otherwise we should have to assert too much. Thus Sarvajñātma-Muni says:

> "Between these there is neither confusion nor combination, nor likewise is any co-inherence possible; hence in reference to the connection between intelligence and its object there appears no original concurrence."

We must therefore affirm that the relation between the intelligent and the unintelligent is that of illusory superpostion. The

1. Pan. 8, 90 (Nov. 1, 1873) 152-156.

inability to account otherwise for the illumination of unintelligent things is thus the evidence that space and the like are illusorily superposed (on absolute spirit). This also is stated by the same authority (Sarvajñātma-Muni) in the words:

> "Let the unintelligent universe therefore be declared an illusory emanation of intelligent spirit, the supreme bliss of heaven; this universe is supposed to be cognisable to spirit when enveloped in the folds of beginningless illusion.

Ether and the rest, then, being illusorily superposed, I am naught else than self-presented self, supreme spirit without duality. And so, as being void of lmitation by things, absolute spirit is evinced to be void of the three-fold limitation (by space, time and things). Thus Vidyāraṇya-Muni says in the *Pañca-kośa-viveka*:

> "Space, time and other things, being imagined by illusion, can constitute no limit; thence the infinity of absolute spirit is obvious."

VIII

The author next anticipates the question: How can self-presented self be absolute spirit, pure intelligence, when in such thoughts as I am stout, I am thin, I am one-eyed. I am deaf, I am dumb, I am hungry, I am thirsty, I am a thinker, I am resolved, it is cognised as corporeal or the like? He proves severally that body and other things are not the soul.

Text

I am not the body, nor an organ, nor vital air, nor common sensory, nor understanding; for t hese are embraced under the notion of what is mine and the objects of the notion this. (8)

Commentary

The body is the head and trunk. The organs are of two kinds; the instruments of cognition, the eye and the rest; and the instruments of action, the hands and so forth. The vital air has five

functions. The common sensory is the doubting faculty. Understanding consists in resolution. The word mine may be applied to the body and the rest severally. These five things, body organs, vital air, common sensory, and understanding, are not self. If one ask why, he replies: Because the notion of these is embraced or contained under the notion of what is mine; and because it is objectified, or made a place for the free play of the understanding.

In this verse the following argument is implied: The body and the rest are severally not-self, because they are objects of the notion mine, and objects of the notion this, like water-pots and the like. Body is not self, because like a water-jar, etc. it possesses colour and other sensible properties. The organs are not self, because, like hatchets, etc., they are instruments. Vital air is not self, because it is air, like the surrounding atmosphere. Collectively speaking, the five are not soul, inasmuch as there is no such assurance as that I am body and so forth. Such assurances as that I am stout may be accounted for, as occasioned by an erroneous attribution of corporeal attributes to the soul, as in the assurance that a crystal is red (when it is only the colour of a rose seen through it which makes it appear so). Nor can the collective aggregate of these be the soul, for a complement of things not self cannot constitute self, as that of houses, etc.

IX

The author anticipates the remark: Let the sense of personality be the self, for that is not an object of the notion of what is mine. Holding that they cannot be identical, since in dreamless slumber and the like states the sense of personality does not exist, though the soul or self exists, he in another manner establishes their diversity.

Text

I am the witness, related to all things, most dear: I am never the snese of personality, since that is immersed in affections, limitations, and afflictions. (9)

Commentary

The witness, that is, consciousness the percipient of desire, aversion and the like modifications of the internal organ. Related to all, connected with all objects, water-pots, pieces of cloth, and everything else. In such thoughts as The water-pot shines forth, The web shines forth, illumination is cognised as connected with all things. Most dear, that is, consisting of beatitude that being most desired. Self is known to be most dear, since we see all men praying for themselves, that they may exist for ever as they never were non-existent. Of such a nature I, the self-presented soul, am never the sense of personality. The reason of this is assigned, *viz*., that the sense of personality is immersed in or conjoined with affections such as desire and aversion, with limitations or restrictions, and with afflictions such as pain. The difference between self and the sense of personality, recognised in the relation of percipient and percept, the one omnipresent, the other limited, the one consisting of felicity, the other of dolour, is manifest. To any one who may ask why then they do not seem to all men to be different; the reply intended is that they are not discriminated, because there is a strong illusory surmisal of unity, as in the case of a red-hot iron ball (where the heat is erroneously identified with the ball).

X

The author anticipates the objection: How can the transmigrating self be absolute spirit ever free? We will not accept the answer that transmigration pertains to the sense of personality and not to self, there being no proof that transmigration which is

manifested in juxtaposition both with the sense of personality and with self, pertains to the sense of personality alone. He shows that such proof is afforded in a concomitance and non-concomitance (by the inductive laws of agreement and disagreement).

Text

When the sense of personality is asleep, the pain, conation, and activity, cease; of me, therefore, the witness of transmigrating personality there is no transmigration. (10)

Commentary

When the sense of personality ceases as in sleep, swoons, pain, conation, and activity, that is, pain, desire and aversion, and their resultant activity are no longer observed. Transmigration therefore attaches to that sense of personality alone; for me, the self-presented self, the witness of that transmigratory sense of personality, there is no metempsychosis. While the sense of personality lasts the transmigratory state is experienced, whether in waking or in dreaming; and when the sense of personality ceases, and the soul is insulated as in dreamless slumber, the transmigratory state is not experienced. The transmigration, therefore, which belongs to the sense of personality, only appears to attach to the soul in consequence of their not being discriminated, just as ignition which really belongs to fire appears from want of discernment, to attach to the iron in the red-hot ball; or as the redness which really belongs to a rose, appears to attach to the crystal of the vase in which the rose is kept. It is in this way that transmigration appears in consequence of the soul's concomitant the sense of personality, to attach to the soul; but does not belong to the soul in itself, not being experienced in dreamless slumber (when the soul is disengaged from the sense of personality). Accordingly Sarvajñātma-Muni says:

"Thy form of agent, enjoyer, knower, comes to thee by illusion, in virtue of thy proximity to the agent, enjoyer, knower; he whose eye is obscured by enveloping illusion beholds that form, which really belongs to the understanding and not to the soul, as if it belonged to his self-presented, pure spirit."

The soul, then, is absolute spirit ever free.

XI

The author next anticipates the objection: If this the case, you must affirm the states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep, of the soul; for if the sense of personality is non-existent in dreamless sleep, and cannot therefore be susceptible of the condition of dreamless sleep, then it must be also unsusceptible of both the waking and dreaming states, inasmuch, as all the three states must belong to the same subject. Holding that dreamless sleep belongs to the sense of personality, since this exists as a mental retentum during dreamless sleep, and not to the soul, since this is the witness of dreamless sleep; and that consequently waking and dreaming also belong to the sense of personality and to that alone; the author proceeds to say:

Text

The sleeper knows not its sleeping, in that which sleeps not there is neither dreaming nor waking; I am the witness of dreaming, waking and dreamless sleep therefore I am not subject to those states. (11)

Commentary

That which when asleep knows not its sleeping, that is the sense of personality alone, under the condition of dreamless sleep, and not the soul. Why? Because the soul remains awake as witness of the illusion that there is during dreamless sleep. In that which sleeps not, that is, in the self-presented self, exempt from the state of dreamless sleep, dreaming and waking find no

place, inasmuch as they attach to the same subject with dreamless sleep.

Another reason is assigned in the words: I am the witness of dreaming, waking, etc. As being the witness, the viewer, of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep, I, the soul, do not undergo those states; that is, the soul has not the waking and other conditions, is exempt from those conditions. There is implied in this verse the following argument: The soul undergoes not the states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep, because it is witness of those states, and whatever is a witness of anything has not (qua witness) that thing is a property; as for instance, the witness of a water-jar has not that water-jar as a property. Sarvajñātma-muni, therefore, who well deserves his name of All-knowing Sage, has said:

> "The three states, visible in intelligence which shines apart, are external to the mind which consists of intelligence alone; for these states are caused by the fact of manifestation and retractation; how canst thou consisting as thou dost of pure intelligence, be confounded with these?"

XII

The author next states that a consideration of the character of waking, dreaming, and dreamless states, shows that these states do not belong to the soul.

Text

Dreamless sleep is a cessation of distinctive cognitions; dreaming and walking are the genesis of such cognitions; how can these three states belong to me, the witness thereof, whose knowledge is eternal? (12)

Commentary

The cessation of distinctive cognition is called dreamless sleep; the genesis of distinctive cognition is called dreaming and

waking. Of these dreaming is knowledge of an ideal world, waking a knowledge of the actual world,– such is the division. What then? He replies. How can these etc. How can these three states, waking, dreaming, dreamless slumber, belong to me, to my soul or self, which has an eternal knowledge consisting of unceasing consciousness, and which is, as before described, the witness of the waking and other states? They cannot belong to me at all.

To explain this: All must allow in reference to the state of dreamless sleep some intelligence to illuminate the absense of illusion during that state of dreamless slumber; otherwise there would be no accounting for the reflection on the part of a man who has just risen that 'he had slept comfortably and not been conscious of anything'. This intelligence is not generable, and the common sensory, the eye, and the other organs being immersed in slumber, it is unlimited. Acoording to the rule, then, that 'an ungenerable entity' is eternal, this intelligence is declared by us to be the soul. How, then, could dreamless sleep, a total cessation of cognitions, attach to the soul which consists of knowledge without beginning and without end? Dreaming and waking, again, are generation of cognition. But the sense of personality, as being a repository of such knowledge as consists of generable modifications, admits of these three conditions.

The soul, then, is exempt from the states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless slumber.

XIII

The author now proceeds to prove that the soul is free from the six changes of being, in order to enforce its identity with unmodified absolute spirit.

Text

I the knower of things which undergo the six changes am free from change; otherwise its cognisance of the changes of those things would be incompetent. (13)

Commentary

These six changes of being are said to be (1) that a thing arises, (2) that it continues to be, (3) that it grows, (4) that it comes to maturity, (5) that it begins to wither, (6) that it undergoes dissolution. I, the soul, the knower of these changing things, *viz.*, of external objects such as thoughts, am free from change, exempt from modification; for the soul cognises the genesis and other changes of things external and internal, and the general rule that what cognises anything is not (qua cognisant) possessed of that thing as a property, being universally accepted, the soul must be free from change. Therefore the author of the *Vārttika* says:

> "One cannot suffer pain without a change or modification, but how can that which undergoes change be a witness? as witnessing thousands of modifications of the understanding, I am exempt from change."

The author next cites an objection to the opposite view, in the words Otherwise, etc. Otherwise its cognisance of changing things would be altogether incompetent, in every way impossible. The purport is this: If the sould undergoes changes, are those changes in the soul and in other things brought about by soul or by anything else? By neither, according to the rule that objects susceptible of change, such as earth and the like, are unsentient.

XIV

Again, let it be asked: Is the soul different from, or the same as, a changing thing and its changes? Our author, having in mind, that they are not different, – inasmuch as different objects, a cow and a horse for instance, do not admit of the relation of thing changing and its changes, – states an objection to the second alternative (*viz.*, that of their identity).

Text

The changing thing is again and again produced and destroyed in each several form; how then could it take cognisance of those things? (14)

Commentary

The changing thing in each several form, as identical with the forms of genesis, continuance, growth, maturescence, decay, dissolution, is again and again produced, and again and again destroyed. How then can the thing which undergoes these modifications take cognisance of the modifications? It can in no wise do so. How can the changing object, he means, which under its form of change, from time to time ceases to be, take cognisance at a subsequent time of that change? It can in no wise do so.

XV

The author starts the following doubt. Let the soul though of itself changeful be cognisant of the changes of itself and of other things. Nor (the doubt proceeds) should any one ask how, if the soul participates in changefulness, it can be cognisant of things other than itself: for, as a gem though itself participant in the nature of a stone yet by its intrinsic difference illumines things other than itself, so the sould must be allowed to cognise things other than itself by its own intrinsic difference. Nor (it is added) should one ask how that which ceases to be at each successive change, can be cognisant of every change; for the doubter does not admit that the changing soul is altogether identical with its changes or modifications, but allows only an identity which involves some small difference, such as that of the cloth and the component threads. He replies that on this supposition the soul still could take no cognisance of its own first and last changes (that is of its own genesis, and dissolution).

Text

Nor can any one see his genesis or dissolution: for these are the last and first moments of antecedent subsequent non-existence. (15)

Commentary

No one however keen, can see his own genesis or dissolution, that is, can know his own birth or annihilation. He gives the reason. This is that they, that is the genesis and dissolution, are the last and first moment of its non-existence *ab ante*; its dissolution is the first moment of its non-existence *à post*. The connection of the words in the text is: None can see his own genesis or dissolution, inasmuch as his genesis and dissolution are the first and the last moments of his antecedent and subsequent non-existences. The purport of the text is as follows. It must be granted that the soul cognises only an object which occupies the same time as the soul itself; just as a lamp illumines only such things as are contemporaneous with itself. Since then, during the time which it lasts, non-existence *ab ante* and *a post* finds no room and cannot be cognised; how should it cognise its own genesis, which is th last moment of its non-existence *ab ante*, and its dissolution, which is the first moment of its non-existence *à post*? It can in no wise cognise them. And if these (the first and last modifications, see§XIII) be unproven of the soul, the intermediate modifications must be equally unproven, in virtue of the rule that the intermediate modification affect the same subject which is affected by genesis and dissolution. The author of the *Bhāṣya* therefore says in the *Vākya-vṛtti* :

> "The designate of the term Thou is distinct from body, sense-organs, common sensory, vital airs, sense of personality, and wholly exempt from the six changes of being."

The self, therefore, as unchangeable, is absolute spirit only.

XVI

The author supposes another doubt. All that you have said already is useless, there being no mean of coming to know that self is the absolute spirit whereof the essence has been described. Nor (the objector continues) is cessation of transmigratory exitence the occasion of our coming to know that the soul is absolute spirit, inasmuch as the cessation thereof is impossible. For this transmigratory existence is manifested in the soul by reason of its concomitant, the sense of personality, and in the form of agency and so forth; and cannot be brought to an end by knowledge, for knowledge labours under an illusion in reggard to the soul caused by the soul's concomitant, the sense of personality. The illusion thus caused by the concomitant must last as long as the concomitant, since it does not survive upon the knowledge of the truth; as in everyday life we see an illusion accidentally determined to last as long as the concomitant which determines it, as in the case of reflected images etc. But you cannot (he continues) assert that a cessation of the agency etc. manifested in the soul and caused by its concomitant the sense of personality, result upon the cessation of this concomitant by means of a knowlege of absolute spirit; for while the radical illusion exists it cannot be brought to a close. Nor (he adds) can you assert that the radical illusion which exists in the soul is terminated by knowledge of absolute spirit; for this illusion not being merely imaginary cannot be brought to an end by the knowledge that it is merely imagined; for otherwise (that is, were the illusion only imaginary) it could have no permanance. The author then proceeds to state that illusion cannot really exist in the soul, with the purpose of showing that it is merely imagined that he may prove it to be terminable by knowledge.

Text

How should darkness touch that self-illumined soul, by whose light alone is caused the saying I shine not? (16)

Commentary

How should darkness, that is illusion, envelope the self-illumined soul, the spirit which shines of itself, whose light, or essential luminousness, is the sole cause of the saying I shine not; for the expression I shine not is caused by light alone, determined by consciousness of one's own irradiation. The meaning is as follows: The soul which shines of itself at all times, illuminates all things. How should it, being such, be touched by ignorance or illusion the opposite of light. The sun with its piercing rays is never seen to be touched by darkness, and why? Because of the repugnance between light and darkness. And so illusion, being incompatible with the soul, cannot really exist therein.

XVII

Anticipating[1] the question why then we cognise ignorance in the soul, as in thinking I shine not forth, the author proceeds to say that this is accounted for by illusion, like the supposition by owls, etc. of darkness in the sun.

Text

Neverthless there does appear in the sky of consciousness some such mist as this an imated by a bsence of reflection, and lasting till the sun of reflection rises. (17)

Commentary

The connection (of this verse of the text with the foregoing verse) is that though in reality illusion cannot exist in the soul, still this dimness, mist, or fog, so called because of the obscuration which it effects, does shine in the sky of consciousness, in the light of intelligence in the soul.

Here it may be asked: How if illusion be in reality unreal, can it be presented in cognition? For there is no perceptive knowledge

1. Pan. 8, 91 (Dec. 1, 1873) 176-180.

of a hare's horns and the like non-entities. To this the author replies by the words *some such mist as this*, that is, such as cannot be expounded as either existing or not existing; that is to say, this darkness being different from both entity and non-entity, there is no impossibility in presentatively cognising it.

If, again, any one should say that this recognition of darkness in the soul is impossible as involving a contradiction; he replies that it is not impossible, for that which is repugnant to darkness must be either an unconscious thing, or the soul which consists of self-illumination. The first alternative will not hold, for there can be no contradiction between darkness and unconsciousness. Nor will the second alternative hold good, inasmuch the darkness can have a duration in its contrary the self-illumined soul. Nor can it be rejoined that the soul, which by the thought I shine not forth establishes the fact of illusion, cannot be repugnant to that illusion; for were the light of which the soul consists not repugnant to illusion, there could be nothing else repugnant and the illusion would never cease. In reference to this he adds to the words *lasting till the sun of reflection rises*. Reflection or the knowledge generated by reflection is a sun as dispelling the darkness, and the darkness finds its period, limit, or boundary, in the rising of that sun, in the genesis of that cognition. Though the soul when isolated is not repugnant to illusion, the illusion may be dispelled by the consciousness of the soul, when there is presented to it a modification of the understanding in the form of the indivisible; just as a ray of the sun by itself, though it illumines a stalk of grass or the like while unable to burn it, yet is seen to burn it when aided by a burning-glass.

In anticipation of the question why then when the modification in the form of the indivisible, generable by the grand text, once exists, the illlusion as to self does not cease in all souls, the author adds the words *animated by absence of. reflection*. Darkness animated by absensce of reflection is such as receives its life, or cause of duration, from the absence of two reflections, *viz.*,

study and meditation on the subject of the evidences given in the latter part of the Veda and the truths evidenced thereby. The modification in the form of the indivisible though generable by texts, does not so long as it is obstructed by want of comprehension and similar impediments, bring illusion to an end, just as fire so long as it is obstructed by gems, spells, and the like, does not consume the grass, etc. with which it is in contact. Sarvajñātma-Muni accordingly has said:

> "As the understanding soiled by the sins of man, though there arise blameless acts of vision, serves no end when supplied with objects, so is the knowledge of the soul which springs from revelation."
>
> "But when want of comprehension and the other obstructives cease upon proper reflection, the modification, no longer obstructed, brings illusion to an end; just as the fire upon the removal of the gems and other obstructives consumes the grass, *etc.*"

The same authority states this also in the words:

> "But when the man's sins are gone, the understanding becomes fruitful through the ejection of the obstructives: just as on the removal of the gem and the spell the smoke rises from the fire."

The inexplicable illusion being imaginary, its termination by knowledge is shown to be possible. Nor is this illusion unimagined, being commonly compared to a lamp, in the doctrine of the Bhāṭṭas to a flash of light, in that of our sacred teachers to sensibility, and in that of others than the Bauddhas to difference or duality. While self-effectuating it involves no infinite regress, for we admit no ulterior illusion. When therefore illusion is brought to a close by knowledge, the cessation of the sense of personality by eradication thereof being brought about, the transmigratory being which consists of agency and fruition, and which is manifested in the soul, and which is caused by the soul's concomitant, the sense of personality, is brought to an end.

The knowledge, then, that the self-conscious soul is absolute spirit is fruitful.

XVIII

The author supposes a difficulty, as follows: If all except absolute spirit be in reality non-existent as imagined by illusion, the ceremonial part of the Veda, *etc.* must be unauthoritative. For this teaches that one who desires paradise and the like should perform sacrifices, and so forth; but all this would be unaccountable if the precept, requitative efficacy, the man instructed and the sacrifice enjoined by the precept, and paradise, the result of the injunction, were in reality unreal. So again, if all but absolute spirit be in reality unreal, the Upaniṣads are unauthoritative, for in these it is taught in the words: 'The soul indeed is to be seen' *etc.*, that one who desires emancipation, must perform sacred study, *etc.* The supposition that this also is unauthoritative is imporper, for portions of the ceremonial revelation and of the Upaniṣads are equally revelation as the text declaratory of absolute spirit. In rejoinder the author inquires: Do you wish to prove the unauthoritative character of the ceremonial revelation, etc., as posterior to knowledge of the truth, or as anterior to such knowledge? The former alternative must be rejected; for its unauthoritative character subsequently to such knowledge is declared to be such as the unauthoritative character relative to a house holder of the revelation which announces the duties of a religious student, or that of the revelation as to the sacred fire relatively to the period of the recluse order. Having this in mind the author proceeds to reply to the second alternative.

Text

In this protracted dream, which the world is, projected in that long sleep, the illusion regarding the soul, flash forth the glimpses, paradise, emancipation, an the rest. (18)

Commentary

In the long dream lasting till knowledge of the truth, and cognised the form of the universe, which is projected, produced, in

the long sleep which has gone from time without beginning, and which is the cause of an essential envelopment, in that long sleep which consists of illusion regarding soul, regarding the self-conscious spiritual substance, flash forth those glimpses, paradise, emancipation, and the rest. By the word paradise there is a subaudition of the desire of paradise, of one instructed, the instruction, and the matter of the instruction, *viz.*, sacrifice, etc. By the word emancipation there is subaudition of knowledge the means of emancipation, of the precept enjoining sacred study, and so forth. The words *and the rest* are designed to comprise sons, friends, and other objects of every-day conventional action and expression. It is to be seen that emancipation presupposing bond-age, and bondage being unreal, emancipation itself which pre-supposes that bondage, is a mere glimpse or hurried movement.

The purport is to the following effect. There is no refusal of the authority of the ceremonial part of the Veda, inasmuch as the whole world, the injunction, those enjoined, and all else, are before the knowledge of the truth, conventionally real, there may be a conventional conversancy about them all, just as in a dream before one awakes; and there is thus a conventional authoritativeness. And in this way, while the matter is admitted, there is sudden sublation of the texts expository of supreme spirit, which have no reference to the matter, and would be otherwise untenable; and which treat of objects real in very truth. Whereas if the matter be explained otherwise than as conventional and conventional authoritativeness be not allowed, we shall have to disallow also the real authoritativeness of the texts declaratory of absolute spirit, and there will be no such thing as authoritativeness at all. Whereas if we allow both to be authoritative but in different ways, it cannot be asserted that there is a .total absence of authority. Brahmā himself, therefore, who knows the meaning of all the Vedas has said:

"A true matter has been decalred by me to be of two kinds, O dwellers in paradise; the one essential, immediate, real, pure existence;

> this is auspicious, consisting of verity, intelligence, infinity of beatitude; the other imagined by illusion directly superposed illusiorily on absolute spirit:
>
> "The Veda declares both the matter which is conventional true, and that which consists of real truth, intelligence: but systems speak not thus."

Hence, though real thruth pertains to secondless absolute spirit only, yet as relating to matter conventionally true the ceremonial part of the Veda has an object matter and is not unauthoritative.

XIX

Anticipating the objection that if individuated spirit the enjoyer and all the objects of its fruition are absolute spirit only, there cannot exists the distinction between enjoyer and enjoyed of which we are cognisant, everything being alike only illusorily surmised in absolute spirit; the author proceeds to declare that this distinction is to be explained by the influence of illusion.

Text

This distinction of conscious and unconscious is imagined in me the conscious; just as on a flat portion of a wall, the distinction of things moving and unmoving in a picture. (19)

Commentary

The distinction of conscious and unconscious is that whereby we recognise that this object enjoyable is unconscious and this enjoyer is conscious. This phaenomenal distinction is imagined in the conscious Ego whose essence is unintermitted consciousness identical with self-presented self absolute spirit. Imagined means supreposed by the cosmical illusion. In the self-luminous one absolute spirit, the imagination of the unconscious object of fruition is accounted for by the predominance of the concomitants; and the imagination of the

conscious subject of fruition is accounted for by the predominance that of which is accompanied. Accordingly the author of the *Vārttika* says:

> "Absolute spirit predominating in consciousness becomes the cause of bodies, in which darkness predominates, and of conscious souls, by means of the works of imaginary illusion."

The author gives an illustration of the imagination of both the like and the unlike in respect to absolute spirit. In the flat and unvarying that is, unmoving, side of a wall, like the distinction between things moving and unmoving, like the distinction between the moving elephants, *etc.* and the unmoving mountains, *etc.* there depicted.

XX

An objection is anticipated, as follows: Even thus the soul cannot be absolute spirit, the soul being possessed of discrimination in virtue of its witnessing transmigratory existence, absolute spirit being proved by such texts as – 'Nor gross nor subtile, Not this, nor that, to be without discrimination'. In reply our author says:

Text

My nature of witness, which consists in a colouring by the intelligible is not real; it is merely an indication of the waveless sea of consciousness. (20)

Commentary

The intelligible means the world constituted by agency, fruition, *etc.* The colouring thereby is connection with the intelligible. My nature as a witness, which is constituted thereby, the character of witness pertaining to me, to self-presented self, is not real, does not in reality exist; for the intelligible being unreal, the nature of witness connected

with it, cannot possess the character of reality. The waveless sea of consciousness, that sea which is in reality free from the waves of agency and other transmigratory conditions is merely indicatory of me, of self-presented self; that is, it is extrinsic to, but gives knowledge of, the soul; just as the substantial causation of the universe is unessential to absolute spirit, but gives us knowledge thereof.

The soul therefore being in reality without discrimination there is nothing to show that it is not absolute spirit.

XXI

The author proceeds to declare that, the world being imagined in absolute spirit, and the sense of personality and other phaenomenal things being imagined in the soul, in the aforesaid manner, and therefore in reality not existing, there is no change in absolute spirit difinable by the two terms (that and thou).

Text

Of me, the ocean of immortality, there is no decay, by the rising of unreal bubbles; of me, the mountain of crystal, there is no colouring by the playings of the dream-begotten clouds of evening. (21)

Commentary

Of the ocean of immortality, of bliss undifferenced self-luminous, emancipation, definable by the term that, of me, of absolute spirit which is naught else than self-presented self, there is not by means of the rising of bubbles of foam, that is by produciton of ether and other phaenomena, and decay; there is neither diminution nor increase,—for the word decay conveys a subaudition of growth; for an unreal thing can do no harm to that upon which it is superposed. That there accrues to absolute spirit from the genesis therein by the cosmical illusion of ether

and the rest, neither, diminution nor increase, is proclaimed also by Bhārtī-tīrtha in the *Kūṭastha-dīpa*, in the words:

> "Illusion is a cloud, the world is the rain thereof; let it rain how it may, there is neither loss nor gain to consciousness which is the sky,—such is the approved position."

He next shows that the designate of the term thou is pure, in the words *of the mountain of cystal, etc.* Of me, of self-presented self, pure as a crystal mountain, there is no colouring by the play of the dream-begotten clouds of evening. Dream-begotten, the sense of personality and the rest imagined by illusion, such is the evening cloud. This cloud of evening is so styled because it resembles a cloud in imposing its own qualities or the cloudless sky in proximity to itself. The playing of this cloud consists of the illusions whereby spirit fancies itself an agent and so forth. The word play in reference to a cloud implies fluctuation of condition. By these arises redness in the sky with reference to the cloud. As then a crystal mountain becomes reddened, not so is there in reality any connection between agency, fruition, desire, and aversion, and the soul which consists of consciousness. That there is no real connection between the soul and the sense of personality and the like conditions, has also been stated by Bhāratī-tīrtha in the *Citra-dīpa*:

> "What should desire and aversion residing in the sense of personality, the diseases of the body, and the birth and decay of vegetables and animals, have to do with the soul consists of consciousness?"

Consciousness, then, the designate of the two terms (that and thou) is absolutely pure

XXII

Anticipating the objection that there is and must be change in absolute spirit designated by the two terms (that and thou), inasmuch as it must be declared to be in reality the

substratum of existent like for otherwise it would be non-existent the horns of a hare; the author proceeds to say:

Text

Like the nature of ether existence is my essence, not a property of me; for there being naught else than I existent, that existence is not called a universal. (22)

Commentary

Existence is the essence of me the designate of the two terms (that and thou), not a property residing in me; as existence, as not depending on or (inhering in) any ulterior existence, cannot be non-existent. Anticipating the question why existence may not attach as a property to soul which is the existent as the universal nature of a jar residing a jar; the author proceeds to say that we cannot allow existence to reside as a universal in soul, there being no plurality of individual existent, in the same way as we allow the universal nature of a jar in order to account for the thought and expression: This is a jar, That is a jar, which applies in common to a plurality of jars. *Naught else than I*, there being no other existent individual besides the soul definable by the two terms (that and thou), existence is not admitted as a universal. An example is next given of the fact that a universal is not allowed to reside in one individual. *Like the nature of ether*. Such universals as the nature of a water-pot are admitted to account for the thought and expression applied in common to many water-pots and so forth; but in the present instance space and all else, being false, and not constituting an ulterior existence, existence as a universal cannot be admitted in the same way that we admitted the nature of a water-pot as a universal; but existence can only be admitted as an essence, like the nature of ether (for there being but one ether, the ethereal principle cannot inhere in

ethers more than one, and is not therefore a common attribute.)

Here some one may say: Let us allow existence as a universal in order to account for the usage (name and notion) applied in common to entities distributed according to their concomitants such as water-jars, pieces of cloth, and so forth, and in conformity with the experiences that the water-jar is existent, the piece of cloth is existent, the wall is existent, and so forth. To this we reply: Not so; for the name and notion of this common applicability may be accounted for by mere existence identical with absolute spirit present alike in all associated things, just as it is accounted for by infinite ether present alike in all parts of ether associated with (or limited by) water-pots, etc.

Existence, then, is not a universal. For the same reason it is not concomitant, for this hypothesis could only be adopted to account for the name and notion of common applicability to many. Tha existence consists of absolute spirit purely existent has also been declared by Vaśiṣṭha, in the words :

> "They declare that to be the absolute in existence which is pure existence, exempt from differences, unmingled, uniform, all extensive."

Thus then existence being an essence and not a property or condition, that which is designated by the two terms (that and thou) is wholly pure.

XXIII

Some one may urge: Yet even thus you must allow soul to be the subject of cognition, else like a wate-jar and so forth, it must be asserted not to be soul at all, the definition of soul being the substratum of knowledge, and that soul is the substratum of knowledge is recognised in the datum of consciousness, 'I cognise'. Accordingly the nature of absolute spirit set forth in the next

witness, thinker, alone and without qualities, cannot belong to the soul. The author therefore says in reply:

Text

Knowledge is the essence of me, not a quality; for if it were a quality it would follow that the knowable and unknowable would be neither soul nor existent. (23)

Commentary

Of me knowledge, consciousness, is the essence, not a quality inhering in me. If one ask why, he replies *for if it were a quality,* etc., *It*, here the masculine form (*sa*) is employed on account of attraction by the predicate (a quality). A controversialist who maintains that consciousness is a quality should be asked: Does this consciousness make the soul its object, or not? To both alternatives the author states an objection. If the knowable and unknowable are apprehensible by the soul, they cannot be soul, just as a water-jar, *etc*; and if they be not apprehensible, it will follow that they are non-existent, like the horns of a hare. If you assert that the soul is not an object of the cognition inhering in the soul, then the soul as not being cognised must be non-existent, for it is not accepted by any one that what is not cognised by means of any evidence, the horns of a hare for instance, has any existence. If on the other hand to escape this difficulty it be asserted that the soul is cognised, it will follow that the soul, like a water-jar and the like cognisables, is not the soul, according to the law that the object of cognition is not the soul.

Some one may say: The soul shines forth (or manifests itself) by reason of the cognition residing in it, as a spiritual substance; not as an object, that it should be not-self a water-jar and the like. To this we reply: Not so, for by the rule that the illumination dependent on cognition but exterior to cognition is an object of

knowledge, the objection will equally accrue that the soul is not soul, because it will necessarily be an object of the illumination dependent on cognition.[1]

Nor let it be held that the nature of subject of knowledge is determinant of the nature of soul, for an easier supposition is that it is the nature of knowledge that is determinant of the nature of soul; and the assurance I know is the object of a modification pertaining to the sense of personality.

Nor let any one contend that knowledge is generable and destructible, as evinced by the assurances that knowledge has ceased, knowledge has arisen: for this also is only the object of a modification.[2]

Knowledge, then, is not a quality, but the essence itself of the soul. Bādarāyaṇa himself has declared in an aphorism, *viz.* Having hence alone, that the soul consists of knowledge. The meaning of this aphorism is thus exhibited by Vidyāraṇya in his *Adhikaraṇa-ratnamālā*. Here he first states a *prima facie* view of the question in the words:

> "The individual soul either consists of consciousness; it is declared to consist of consciousness, for consciousness being absent in dreamless slumber and similar sates, the waking consciousness is effected by the internal sensory."

He then proceeds to state the received tenet:

> "Because it is absolute spirit it consists of consciousness, consciousness is not suspended in dreamless sleep, for the vision of duality, inasmuch as duality is sublated, belongs not to the seer.[3]

Some one may object: The soul consisting of knowledge either knows itself or does not. If it knows itself it follows that it is

1. Absolute existence may be present in all phaenomena, which are non-existent *per se*; just as space may be present in the spaces contained in water-jars and the like; existence and space not being participated in by them, as universals by singulars, but as themselves all-embracing singulars.

2. And modifications of the internal organs are illusory and unreal.

3. Not to the self-conscious soul, but to the internal organ under the accession of illusion.

at once agent and acted upon. If it does not know itself, that it does not exist at all. *Negatur*: for the soul, as self-luminous manifests itself without requiring an ulterior cognition. Nor does the soul admit the relation of agent and thing acted upon, for we do not allow that it can become its own object. The venerated Vidyāraṇya accordingly says in the *Pañca-kośa-viveka*:

> "As knowing itself of itself it is not made known; it is not cognisable because there is no difference between the knower and the knowledge, but not because it does not exist."

How indeed, we may ask, should that be non-existent, by the grace of which all the world shines forth; or how should that not itself appear. That the soul illumines all things, and shines without need of aught beside itself is also declared in the *Ātma-yogavimśa*:

> "I am that consciousness which by my own existence superintending illusion, its emanations, and their varieties, by reason of my own luminousness cannot be either remembered or forgotten in dreams or other states."

The soul, then, *is* knowledge, and has not knowledge merely as a quality. It must therefore be absolute spirit exempt from qualities.

XXIV

The[1] author proceeds to evince that in like manner bliss is not a quality but the essence of spirit.

Text

It is I that am bliss, naught else; for where it aught else, that could not be bliss, since were that not for my sake it would not be dear, and were it for my sake it would not be dear per se. (24)

1. Pan. 9, 102 (Nov. 2, 1874) 136-142.

Commentary

I the soul am bliss itself, have bliss for my essence, and have not bliss merely as a quality. Were felicity a quality, and not spirit itself, it might be accounted bliss, but would not be bliss. If you ask why, we propose the following dilemma: Is this bliss, which is not soul, not an adjunct of soul, or is it an adjunct of soul?

The author shows that the former alternative will not hold good. Were it not for may sake—here the particle *cet* must be supplied from the preceding line—, that is, if it be not an adjunct of soul or self, it will not be dearm will not be an object of delight: for we do not observe snakes and the like, not accessories of self, to be objects of delight.

He shows that the second alternative will not hold good. Were it for my sake—here also the particle *cet* is to be supplied—were it for my sake, were it an adjunct or accession to me, it would not be desirable *per se*: for we do not observe a wife, a child, or the like accession to self or soul to be *per se* objects of delight. For bliss is dear to all, and bliss is desirable *per se*, and not only mediately or indirectly; and hence it must be the soul itself, the very self.

You ask how? Hear then: There are four modes of all things in the universe, according as they are (1) self, (2) desirable, (3) undesirable, (4) indifferent. Now bliss, as the universal end of pursuit, cannot be undesirable, like tigers and such like objects; and for the same reason it cannot be indifferent like a clod of earth and the like; not is it co-extensive with the desirable, for we observe it in the adjuncts of the desirable, in a wife or child for instance: it follows therefore, by the methods of residues that it is the soul itself, or very self.

If you ask, why it may not be an object of delight as accessory to self: we demand what the cause of bliss in the soul may be, whereby bliss is rendered desirable to the soul or self as an adjunct. If you reply that the soul is determinant of bliss, you must then tell us of

some subject to be gratified by self thus determining bliss; for we see that garlands, sandal-wood, and similar cause of pleasure, are subservient to something ulterior to themselves. Now the relation of act and agent is repugnant to the nature of spirit; and we see naught else to which it can be subservient. Soul then is not desirable as the determinant of bliss, but as being bliss itself; and bliss is not dear as an adjunct to the soul but as very self.

You object: Consciousness assures us that pleasure or bliss comes into being and cease to be; how can it be self? We refuse the objection, for this (apparently generable and destructible bliss) is the object of a modification manifesting it (in the internal organ illusorily). All this is stated in the Brhmānanda:

> "Self, the adjunct, the indifferent, the undesirable, among these four self is dearest, the adjunct is dear, the undesirable and the indifferent are ulterior to those two (to self and to the appendages of self).
>
> Such is the order of the universe; and such is the doctrine of Yājñavalkya:
>
> Food and the like things are desirable conditionally as determinants of pleasure.
>
> To whom should self be subservient, by being like food and the like, because of agreeableness to self? In one and the same thing there cannot exist the nature both of cause and effect."

Sarvajñātma-Muni also states in the following lines that self is identical with bliss:

> "That for the sake of which every thing exists, whatever it may be; that which by its own essence escapes subserviency; that they explain to be bliss, who know the character of felicity; that is indentical with the self-presented self; thence is its being blissful."

And in the *Brahma-gītā* it is written:

> "Self-conscious spirit, Šiva is directly characterised as supreme felicity, as manifested to consciousness as the highest object of delight. Not everything is desirable to the desire of every one; but self is most

> desirable to the desire of self: wherefore is not self, ye gods, most desirable, and characterised as bliss?

It is then beyond controversy that according to revelation, the consciousness of the speculative, and the deliverances of the erudite, soul or self has bliss for its essence.

XXV

Here an objection may be started. The indivisible and unmingled nature of absolute spirit posited in the Vedic text to be regarded as uniform, is no longer competent; inasmuch as in the manner described it has a threefold nature consisting of the existent, intelligence, and bliss. Now these three (it is urged) the existent, intelligence, and bliss, cannot be asserted to be absolutely identical; for, were they so, the three terms designatory of them, the existent, intelligence, and bilss, could not, as being synonyms, be used in juxtaposition to each other: for words like water-pot, water-jar, pitcher, which have the same denotation, cannot be simultaneously employed. After starting this doubt the author proceeds to prove the indivisibility and uniformity of absolute spirit.

Text

For the one reality cannot ever be of diverse natures; hence I am absolutely indivisible, transcending the cosmical duality. (25)

Commentary

The one, secondless, reality, absolute spirit, consisting of the existent, intelligence, and bliss, cannot ever, whether in the time of its illusory concomitants or in the time when there are no illusory concomitants, be of diverse natures, multiform. In these words the term reality is a limitation intended as an argument; because absolute spirit is reality, exists in reality, therefore it cannot ever be of diverse natures. The adoption of the word reality is to imply

additionally intelligence and bliss. The sense then is as follows. If the truth (or existence), the intelligence, and the bliss in absolute spirit were different one form the other, we could not prove that the truth was truth, that the intelligence (or cogntion) was intelligence, or that the bliss was bliss. You ask why. We reply that truth if different from cognition, could not, as being unconscious like the silver illusorily superposed upon nacre, be true or real.

In the same manner if cognition were different from truth, this untrue cognition, as determined by unconsciousness[1] would not be cognition. To shew then that truth is truth and intelligence, intelligence, we must allow that they are absolutely identical the one with the other. Accordingly Sarvajñātma-Muni says:

> "In truth there is the nature of cognition, and in cognition there is truth. This is clearly the case. And while this is the case, there is yet no redundancy both truth and cognition being compatible in the completed principle (or one reality)."

In like manner if bliss were different from intelligence, then as different from intelligence, like water-jars and the like unconscious things, it could not be blissful. And again if cognition were different from bliss, then as different from bliss, and consequently unconscious like the water-pot and the rest, cognition would not be cognition. Thus to show that cognition and bliss are cognition and bliss, we must grant that they are absolutely identical the one with the other. This is also stated by the same authority:

> "Without doubt there is found in the nature of bliss the nature of knowledge and in the nature of knowledge the nature of bliss: and while this is the case there is no room for redundacy, bliss and cognition being compatible in the completed principle."

In like manner if bliss werer different from truth, then as being untrue like the silver illusorily superposed upon nacre, bliss could not be blissful. Again if truth were different from bliss, the

1. The unconscious and the untrue or unreal being co-extensive.

unblissful resultant, like the silver illusorily superposed upon nacre would be untrue. We must therefore affirm absolute identity also between truth and bliss. This is also set out by the same authority:

> "It is current beyond controversy that in the nature of bliss there is the nature of truth, and in the nature of truth the nature of bliss: and while this is the case, there is no room for redundancy, truth and bliss being compatible in the same completed principle."

The same is evidently inferrible in regard to eternity absoluteness, purity, *etc.* in undifferenced being. Nor should it be contended that if these be absolutely indentical with one another, the terms which denote them, truth and so forth, are synonymous. A difference in the sense of the terms must be allowed. The term truth is applicable to truth consisting of absolute spirit identified with the highest and with the not highest reality, with space, and conditioned supreme spirit. The term cognition again is applicable to knowledge in its conditionate form of two cognitions, a higher and a lower, and identified respectively with self-conscious spirit and with modifications of the internal sensory. The term bliss again is applicable to bliss in a higher and in a lower form identified respectively with self-conscious spirit and with modifications of the internal sensory. All this is set out by the same Sarvajñātma-Muni:

> *"In space and the like there is one reality, in the self-presented self there is another reality.*
>
> *From juxtaposition of both there emerges a third reality. And to all these the term real is applicable."*
>
> *In a modification of the understanding there is one nature of cognition, in the apprehension of the self-presented self there is another. From juxtaposition of both there emerges a third. And the term knowledge is applicable to all.*
>
> *"In a modification of the understanding there is one blissfulness, in the self-presented self there is another blissfulness. And the selfsame term bliss is applicable to all."*

In short there being a diversity in the denotable matter, the terms cannot be synonymous.

Starting the difficulty, How then if there is a diversity in the denotable matter can truth and the rest be absolutely id entical? The author answers that they are indentical, inasmuch as, while the denotation is diverse, there is an absolute identity in all that is implicated.

This he does in the words: Hence I am absolutely indivisible, transcending the cosmical duality. Inasmuch as truth, knowledge, and bliss, as reciprocially identical, consist each of truth and knowledge and bliss, and inasmuch as they are not synonymous, they transcend the cosmical diversity, the duality generated by illusory concomitants such as the universe and space. Hence I am absolutely indivisible, purely uniform not multiform; that is, I am uniform and indivisible consisting of reality, intelligence, and beatitude, denoted with implication of a portion by the terms reality, intelligence, and beatitude. Thus the uniformity set out in the text To be regarded as uniform, is accounted for.

XXVI

The author now proceeds to expound by means of implication by abandonment of a portion the absolute identity of individuated and absolute spirit, the text 'That art thou', *etc.*, confirmed as it is in the manner above set out by argumentations which evince that the individuated soul is absolute spirit.

Text

Undefiled by disengagement from unconsciousness, limitation, and relativity, I am uniform glory, implicated in the text 'That art thou. (26)

Commentary

Undefiled, pure, not repugnant to unity, by disengagement by abandonment of unconsciousness, limitation and ther-relativity from which gives rise to them. Unconsciousness is unconsciousness of diety; limitation, the limitation of individuated spirit. By these two terms there is a subaudition of all the other contradictory attributes residing in individuated spirit an the Lord. Relativity is the total connection determined by the illusory concomitants the interior sensory and its illusion, which gives rise to the unconscious limitation, and other like modes, both in the individuated spirit and in the Lord implicated in the text, the grand text, 'That art thou' to be understood by implication derelictive and non-derelictive of the denotation. The essence of the implicate is set out in the words *uniform glory*. I am glory that, is truth, knowledge, bliss; I am the self-presented self. Here as in former places corroborative argumentation should be taken into account. If self were other than absolute spirit, the nature of self would not be definable as interiority to all things. Again, if absolute spirit were other than self, the nature of absolute spirit would not be definable as illimitable greatness. This we find set out by the same authority (Sarvajñātma-Muni):

> "In the non-dual there is the nature of self-presented self, and in self-presented self likewise there is the nature of non-duality. And if this be the case there is no room for redundancy: for the objects designated by *That and thou* are compatible in the completed principle."

The words That and thou, it should be added, as having a diverse denotation, are not synonymous: a statement which we find made by the same author:

> "Though if we take the non-derelicted portion the diference of the two terms be an absolute minimum, yet taking the derelicted portion, the two terms remain. There is therefore no propriety in overlooking that which is external in thee, luminousness of non-dual self though thou be."

The meaning of the text is set forth in a lucid manner in the *Brahma-gītā* by Brahmā who knows the import of all the Vedas:

> "Revelation does not intimate that the body and the like things are as the objects denotable by the words thou and I, the meaning of those words; the revelation is That art thou.
>
> For the text speaks by dereliction of the part of the sentence indicative of that which is repugnant to the unity of things, and by implication of that which is not repugnant, viz., intelligence.
>
> And in the signification of That there is identity with the signification of the word thou, without any repugnant portion, but with implication only of causality and so forth in the designate (of the term That).
>
> It declares moreover the identity of the signification of the word That with the word thou to consist in intelligence, that, to wit, of the supreme spirit, pure consciousness, which is the designate of the terms That and thou; an indentity which is self-evident: for such is the import of the text, ye orthodox."

In short, then, it is established by revelation, argumentation, and the deliverances of the most erudite, that individuated spirit is in its essence the existent intelligence, beatitude, eternal, pure, enlightened, unconditioned.

XXVII

The author now concludes this sectional treatise with a reference to its end, *viz.* the incorporeal emancipation, characterised as the permanent state of being absolute spirit self-luminous and illimitably blissful, and the emancipation during life definable as the permanent state of being absolute spirit accompanied with manifestations of the organism, organs etc. until exhaustion of fructescent merits, in the individual soul when it presents to itself as itself absolute spirit the essence whereof has been set forth.

Text

I am the full glory self-evident, without beginning and without end, in which the illusory appearance of the universe, the in-

dividuated spirit, the disciple, the master, and the Lord, is brought to an end. (27)

Commentary

I am that wherein the illusory phantasmagoria consisting of the universe, individuated spirit, disciple, master, and the Lord, is brought to a period or sublated in the state of living emancipation, and altogether annualled in the state of incorporeal emancipation. That these two modes of emancipation are the fruit of knowledge has been declared also by Sarvajñātma-Muni:

> "A living emancipation there is, as is attested by consciousness; and a shadow of duality ther is therein, as is attested by consciousness; and a slight degree of retention of this shade of duality there is: of this matter one's own consciousness is the evidence.
>
> The theosophist therefore after abiding in the state of living emancipation for the consummation of the fruition of fructescent merits, and after experiencing the resultant fruition which has lost its savour, attains finally to absolute isolation."

I am the self-evident, self-luminous, glory, brightness, without beginning and without end, full, containing the whole *pleroma*.

XXVIII

The author now solicits the activity of theosophists upon the sectional treatise which he has constructed, and which is a summary of the kernel of the significance of the Upaniṣads.

Text

Be this Nectar of Monism, of the Lakṣmī-dhara, culled from the autumn lotuses of verses, sipped by the theosophistic bees. (28)

Commentary

Lakṣmīdhara is the name of the author. He is a sage, all-knowing, intuiting the transcendent. His verses are autumn lotuses. Of these is composed this *Nectar of Monism* patent to all men. The principle of Monism is the unconditioned, or absolute spirit. Nectar is the sweets of flowers; as it is said in the *Brahma-gītā*:

> "This nectar when a man has once obtained, he becomes eternally beatified in all places; nor otherwise the blessed gods."

Theosophists are bees, familiar with the sweets of the unconditioned. By them be it sipped, be it frequented again and again, till the absolute cessation of illusion; as it is said by Bhārati-Tīrtha:

> "If after reflection he recognise not himself intuitively as absolute spirit, let him reflect again and again until the intuition comes."

Though much remains that might be said on each verse of the text, yet as we took in hand to analyse it for the unintelligent and unindustrious, we desist, lest we add to the difficulty or the extent of our commentary.

The Commentar's Epilogue

(i) The Manifestation of the *Sweets of Nectar of Monism* was composed by Svayam-prakāśa the ascetic, at the behest of Puruṣottama.

(ii) This Manifestation of the Sweets is to be reverntly learnt by those excellent inquirers who wish to taste the joys of absolute being.

(iii) *Bathe joyously ye excellent* aspirants to emancipation, scorched by *the sun of three-fold affliction*, in the Manifestation of the Sweets, *as in the Ganges.*

(iv) Let the learned forgive the shortcomings of my intellect, as shown in what is set forth in the explanation; may the Lord who has Ambā as half his body, be gracious as a father towards the shortcomings of a son.

(v) Let my suppliant mind hover like a bee at the twin lotus-feet of Kaivalyānanda Yogīndra, which distil the sweets of emancipation, frequented by pure swans, unsullied.

(vi) I ever celebrate Śivānanda Yogīndra, whose understanding is immersed in the ocean of intelligence, the repository of good qualities, who teaches to men the highest principle, absolute spirit.

(vii) I dore the husband of Jānakī the crest-gem of the all-wise, the lord of lords, whose frame is as tender as a lotus, the ambrosial ocean of tenderness and beauty.

(viii) I adore Śiva, decorated with the lunar digit, whose slightest smile beatifies his votaries, whose left side (Ambā) is delighted with his beauty, fully satisfied with his own felicity, who laughs exultantly, and I adore Ambā.

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